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ABSTRACT 
Laypeople’s stances towards expert knowledge and the relationships of 
personal values to such stances are little studied and remain less than clear. 
The purpose of this dissertation was to shed more light on these stances and 
their relationships to personal values, and thereby to contribute to a greater 
understanding of them. More specifically, this study focusses on the 
readiness of laypeople to question experts’ views, their non-adherence to 
doctors’ instructions, and their preferences to seek health advice or 
treatment from either medical experts (i.e. doctors) or from practitioners of 
complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) as well as the associations of 
personal values with each of these. 
This study used population-based samples from a range of European 
countries. One of the three sub-studies used survey data collected in Finland 
for the specific purposes of this study and the other two sub-studies used 
open-access data from the European Social Survey. The data was mostly 
quantitative and was analysed using statistical methods, such as logistic 
regression analysis.  
The first of the three sub-studies examined the ten values specified in 
Schwartz’s (1992) theory of basic human values as well as the values of 
rational truth and non-rational truth proposed by Wach and Hammer 
(2003b). The results showed that the values of rational truth and power were 
positively associated with the readiness to question experts’ views (RQEV), 
whereas the values of security, conformity and tradition were negatively 
associated with RQEV. Moreover, the analysis of laypeople’s reasons for not 
disagreeing with experts indicated that these reasons were related to 
individual factors (personal characteristics, unwillingness to disagree and 
trust in experts), situational factors (importance of the issue and practical 
realities), social risks and views on experts.  
The results of the second sub-study indicated that endorsing openness-to-
change values (vs. conservation values) was positively associated with non-
adherence to doctors’ instructions. In the third sub-study, endorsing 
conservation values (vs. openness-to-change values) was found to be 
positively associated with preferring doctors’ consultations and negatively 
associated with preferring other practitioners and with the use of CAM 
treatments. It was also found that valuing self-transcendence (vs. self-
enhancement) was positively associated with CAM use. Furthermore, a 
context-specific factor, namely country-level personal freedom, was found to 
be negatively associated with the preference to consult doctors, and 
positively associated with preferring other practitioners and the use of CAM.  
This study demonstrates that taking into account motivational constructs, 
such as personal values, contributes to an understanding of how laypeople 
relate to expert knowledge.  
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
Maallikoiden tavoista suhtautua asiantuntijatietoon ja arvojen yhteyksistä 
näihin suhtautumistapoihin on toistaiseksi vain vähän tutkimustietoa. Tämä 
väitöstutkimus tarkastelee asiantuntijatietoon suhtautumista kolmesta 
näkökulmasta. Ensimmäinen liittyy valmiuteen kyseenalaistaa 
asiantuntijoiden näkemyksiä, toinen lääkäreiden antamien ohjeiden 
noudattamiseen ja kolmas halukkuuteen konsultoida ensisijaisesti joko 
lääkäreitä tai täydentävän ja vaihtoehtoisen lääketieteen harjoittajia 
terveysneuvojen tai hoidon saamiseksi. Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on lisätä 
ymmärrystä erilaisista suhtautumistavoista ja arvojen yhteydestä niihin.  
Tutkimuksessa käytettiin väestöotoksiin pohjautuvia kyselyaineistoja 
Suomesta ja yli kymmenestä muusta Euroopan maasta. Aineisto oli 
pääasiassa määrällistä, ja sen analysoimiseen käytettiin tilastollisia 
menetelmiä, kuten logistista regressioanalyysia. 
Ensimmäisessä tutkimuksen kolmesta osatutkimuksesta tarkasteltiin 
Schwartzin (1992) arvoteorian kymmentä arvoa sekä kahta teorian 
ulkopuolista, rationaaliseen ja ei-rationaaliseen totuuteen liittyvää arvoa. 
Tulokset osoittivat, että rationaaliseen totuuteen ja valtaan liittyvät arvot 
olivat positiivisessa yhteydessä valmiuteen kyseenalaistaa asiantuntijoiden 
näkemyksiä, kun taas säilyttämisarvojen (turvallisuus, yhdenmukaisuus ja 
perinteet) yhteydet tähän valmiuteen olivat negatiivisia. Lisäksi analysoitiin 
ihmisten raportoimia syitä siihen, miksi he eivät olleet esittäneet 
asiantuntijalle eriävää näkemystään tai olleet asiantuntijan kanssa eri mieltä. 
Näiden syiden havaittiin liittyvän yksilöllisiin ja tilannetekijöihin, sosiaalisiin 
riskeihin ja näkemyksiin asiantuntijoista. 
Toisessa osatutkimuksessa tarkasteltiin sekä suhtautumista lääkäreiden 
ohjeiden noudattamiseen että ohjeiden mukaan toimimista (reseptin 
noudattaminen). Tutkimuksessa havaittiin, että muutosvalmiusarvot olivat 
yhteydessä vähäisempään ohjeiden noudattamiseen. Kolmannessa 
osatutkimuksessa puolestaan havaittiin, että säilyttämisarvot olivat 
yhteydessä yhtäältä taipumukseen konsultoida lääkäreitä ja toisaalta 
vähäisempään vaihtoehtoisten toimijoiden konsultoimiseen ja 
vaihtoehtohoitojen käyttämiseen. Itsensä ylittämisen arvostaminen taas oli 
positiivisessa yhteydessä vaihtoehtohoitojen käyttämiseen. Lisäksi todettiin, 
että myös maittain vaihtelevalla henkilökohtaisen vapauden tasolla oli 
merkitystä: Mitä vapaampia ihmiset olivat, sitä enemmän he olivat 
taipuvaisia konsultoimaan vaihtoehtoisia toimijoita ja käyttämään 
vaihtoehtohoitoja. Vähäisempi vapaus taas oli yhteydessä taipuvaisuuteen 
konsultoida lääkäreitä.  
Kaiken kaikkiaan tämä tutkimus osoitti, että ihmisiä motivoivien 
tekijöiden, kuten arvojen, huomioiminen voi auttaa ymmärtämään erilaisia 
tapoja suhtautua asiantuntijatietoon. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The majority of people encounter experts1 at some point in their life. Even 
though people may not personally meet or interact with experts on a daily 
basis, most of them nevertheless come across experts’ views in some form, 
for example when experts give recommendations or comment on some 
current topic in the media. For instance, analyses of news material indicate 
that researchers and other experts are frequently used as sources in 
newspapers and newscasts (Albaek, Christiansen, & Togeby, 2003; Niemi & 
Pitkänen, 2016).  
Laypeople depend on experts in numerous ways, particularly in modern 
societies characterised by a high degree of division of cognitive labour and 
specialisation (Bromme & Thomm, 2016; Scholz, 2009). Health and 
medicine serve as examples of domains in which it is usually not possible for 
laypeople to have all the relevant knowledge, and therefore it may be rational 
for them to rely on relevant experts or authorities in order to make 
judgements about issues in these domains (Cummings, 2014a). 
A medical doctor is a typical example of an expert whose views and 
decisions directly affect laypeople’s lives, even though expert opinion may 
influence people’s lives indirectly, too (e.g., in the form of national or 
international nutrition recommendations). In many situations, it is 
important to listen to experts’ views and follow their advice, since their views 
are usually more likely to be correct than non-experts’ views (Weinstein, 
1993).  
Despite this, experts sometimes make mistakes (Weinstein, 1993) and 
their views may be influenced by interests or biases (Bornstein & Emler, 
2001; Goldman, 2001). In most cases, it may be irrational to “defer to 
someone’s opinion absolutely whatever that opinion might be” (Elga, 2007, 
p. 483). Therefore, it is important that laypeople evaluate experts’ views 
(Kutrovátz, 2010) and be prepared to question them where warranted.  
In cases in which people need expert advice, they must identify the 
relevant experts to consult (Cummings, 2014a). Laypeople seem to be able to 
judge which fields of expertise are relevant for specific scientific topics 
                                                 
1 An epistemic, cognitive or intellectual expert in a particular domain “is someone who possesses 
an extensive fund of knowledge (true belief) and a set of skills or methods for apt and successful 
deployment of this knowledge to new questions in the domain” (Goldman, 2001, p. 92). Therefore, 
epistemic expertise differs from performative expertise in that “epistemic expertise is the capacity to 
provide strong justifications for a range of propositions in a domain, while performative expertise is 
the capacity to perform a skill well” (Weisntein, 1993, p. 57). This dissertation adopts a wide 
understanding of the term expert, and considers also authorities (or other people in higher positions), 
such as teachers and superiors. It is worth noting that the concepts of expert and authority are closely 
related although not identical (Pirttilä-Backman, 1993). 
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(Bromme & Thomm, 2016), and to differentiate between conditions in which 
experts’ views concerning complex public health issues are more or less valid 
(Cummings, 2014a). However, it may be challenging for them to decide 
which expert to ask or which expert to believe in everyday issues that have 
personal relevance (see Bromme & Goldman, 2014). Moreover, laypeople 
sometimes choose to consult others instead of conventional or authorised 
experts. For instance, when facing health problems, people may decide to 
seek advice or treatment from practitioners of complementary and 
alternative medicine (CAM) instead of relying solely on conventional medical 
experts. Indeed, the use of CAM treatments has increased in popularity even 
though there is only limited scientific evidence for their effectiveness 
(Pedersen & Baarts, 2010)2. 
The relationships between personal values—what is important for people 
in their lives (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003)—and stances towards expert 
knowledge have been rarely examined (for related studies, see Devos, Spini, 
& Schwartz, 2002; Morselli, Spini, & Devos, 2012; Passini, 2015). However, 
since values by their definition “guide selection or evaluation of behavior and 
events” (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, p. 551), more generally serve as guiding 
principles in people’s lives (Schwartz, 1992), and have been also found to be 
empirically associated with different attitudes and behaviours (Bardi & 
Schwartz, 2003; Boer & Fischer, 2013; Miles, 2015), it is likely that they also 
play a role in people’s stances towards expert knowledge. 
The relationships between personal values and stances towards expert 
knowledge have to date been rarely studied and therefore this study 
contributes to filling this gap. In this context particularly, there is a lack of 
research that would include a comprehensive set of values. The current thesis 
consists of three studies each of which examines the proposition that 
considering motivational constructs, such as values, may provide new 
insights into and can help in understanding different aspects of laypeople’s 
stances towards expert knowledge. All three studies adopt Schwartz’s (1992) 
theory of basic human values and analyse the associations of values with a 
particular aspect of relating to expert knowledge: readiness to question 
experts’ views, non-adherence to experts’ instructions, and preferences in 
seeking advice from experts.  
More specifically, Study I examines the associations of personal values 
with the readiness to question experts’ views (RQEV) in knowledge-related 
matters. It considers not only the ten values specified in Schwartz’s theory, 
but incorporates also two truth-related values proposed by Wach and 
Hammer (2003a, 2003b), namely rational truth and non-rational truth, 
which have not been previously studied in relation to RQEV or related 
constructs. Study I also analyses people’s reasons for not having disagreed 
with experts. Study II examines the relationship between values and non-
                                                 
2 However, this naturally also depends on how the effects are measured and what is considered as 
evidence of effectiveness (Staud, 2011), as well as the type of CAM treatment. 
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adherence to doctors’ instructions. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this 
relationship has not been previously examined using a comprehensive set of 
values3 (for related studies, see Gauchet, Tarquinio, & Fischer, 2007; Zhang, 
Dindoff, Arnold, Lane, & Swartzman, 2015). Study III investigates whether 
values play a role in people’s preferences in seeking health advice from 
doctors or CAM practitioners as well as use of CAM. Even though different 
beliefs and personality traits have been found to be related to preferences in 
seeking health advice from medical doctors or CAM practitioners, values as 
such have been examined only in one study (Saher & Lindeman, 2005), 
which analysed beliefs about the efficacy of CAM but did not measure actual 
use of CAM.  
The present study uses data collected from nationally representative 
samples from Finland (Study I) and a range of other European countries 
(collected by the European Social Survey; Studies II and III). Using data from 
a range of countries is advantageous, because it provides the opportunity to 
gain a more extended and robust view of the associations of values with other 
relevant constructs. It also allowed for examining whether the context of 
specific countries—in this case citizens’ rights and freedom to make their own 
choices—play a role in individuals’ preferences in seeking health advice 
(Study III), thus making a novel contribution to the existing literature. 
                                                 
3 See Karimi and Clark (2016) for a review of research on the role of values in heart failure patients’ 
self-care decisions, including adherence to self-care recommendations. Karimi and Clark found that 
values were not often explicitly mentioned in these studies, but they seemed to play an integral role in 
this context. 
Personal values 
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2 PERSONAL VALUES 
Summarising the recurring features in literature on values (e.g., Rokeach, 
1973), Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, p. 551) defined the concept of human 
values as follows: “values are (a) concepts or beliefs, (b) about desirable end 
states or behaviors, (c) that transcend specific situations, (d) guide selection 
or evaluation of behavior and events, and (e) are ordered by relative 
importance.” To put it more briefly, values are desirable transsituational 
goals that vary in importance, and serve as guiding principles in people’s 
lives (Schwartz, 1992, 1994). Values have been studied using various 
approaches having somewhat different emphases (for reviews on value 
construct, see Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004; Rohan, 2000). Schwartz’s (1992) 
theory of basic human values and its refined version (Schwartz et al., 2012) 
emphasise the universal aspects of the content and structure of individual 
values, whereas Schwartz’s (2006a) theory of cultural value orientations 
focuses on cultural values and cross-cultural comparison, as does Hofstede’s 
(1980, 2001) theory. Inglehart’s (1977) modernisation theory and its revised 
version (e.g., Inglehart & Welzel, 2010) focus on cultural value change and 
cross-cultural differences. Other theories focus on the functions of values 
(Gouveia, Milfont, & Guerra, 2014: functional theory of human values) and 
morality and moral values (e.g., Haidt & Graham, 2007: moral foundations 
theory). 
What differentiates individual values from some other closely related 
concepts? Values, as compared to attitudes, are more abstract and durable 
(Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004; Schwartz, 1992). As regards traits and values, they 
are both durable; however, values are motivational goals and refer to what is 
important for people, whereas traits are descriptions of peoples’ 
dispositions—what people are like (Parks-Leduc, Feldman, & Bardi, 2015; 
Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, & Knafo, 2002). Norms are related to external 
pressure—what people think they ought to do—in specific situations, whereas 
values are transsituational and refer to ideals (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; 
Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004). Norms may hinder people from acting according to 
their values or ideals in situations in which normative pressures are high 
(Bardi & Schwartz, 2003). This applies particularly to those people who give 
high priority to conformism values (Lönnqvist, Walkowitz, Wichardt, 
Lindeman, & Verkasalo, 2009). Also, values are a way for articulating needs 
(Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004); they are cognitive representations of the needs and 
requirements of human existence—they concern biological needs of 
individuals, demands of coordinated social interaction, and demands for 
group welfare and survival (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987). 
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2.1 THEORY OF BASIC HUMAN VALUES 
In his theory of basic human values, Schwartz (1992) specified ten values that 
he derived from the aforementioned universal requirements of individuals 
and groups. Schwartz’s theory covers a comprehensive set of near universal 
values (recognised in most of the cultures and understood in the same way 
across cultures). It also specifies the interrelations of values as arranged to a 
motivational continuum, which is built on cross-culturally stable 
compatibilities and conflicts among values. As regards the content of values, 
Schwartz (1992) proposed ten basic values, each of which is defined and 
differentiated from other values by the motivational goal it expresses. 
Benevolence involves protecting the welfare of close others; universalism 
involves understanding, tolerating and protecting the welfare of all people 
and nature; self-direction refers to thinking and acting independently; 
stimulation concerns excitement, novelty and challenge; hedonism involves 
pleasure and satisfying sensuous needs; achievement involves the 
demonstration of one’s own competence in terms of social standards, thereby 
gaining personal success; power involves social status and controlling other 
people and resources; security concerns safety, harmony and stability; 
conformity refers to self-restraint from actions that may violate social norms 
and upset or harm others; and tradition considers respect and commitment 
to the customs and ideas provided by culture or religion. 
Values are arranged in a circular continuum (see Figure 1) according to 
the similarities and differences of their motivational goals (Schwartz, 1992, 
1994; Schwartz et al., 2012). Compatible values that are easy to pursue at the 
same time are located close to each other, whereas conflicting values are 
located on opposite sides of the value circle. These relationships produce a 
two-dimensional structure: The first dimension, openness to change–
conservation, contrasts values emphasising independence and change, 
readiness for new ideas, actions, and experiences (i.e., self-direction and 
stimulation) with values emphasising self-restriction, order, preservation of 
the status quo and avoiding change (i.e., security, conformity and tradition). 
The second dimension, self-transcendence–self-enhancement, contrasts 
values that motivate people to promote others’ welfare (i.e., universalism and 
benevolence) with values that motivate people to pursue their own interests 
(i.e., power and achievement). Schwartz (1994) considered hedonism as 
sharing elements of both openness to change and self-enhancement. 
Schwartz (2012) also posited that since values form a motivational 
continuum, partitioning values into ten is an arbitrary choice, and therefore 
it is equally reasonable for researchers to use more broadly or narrowly 
defined values. Recently, Schwartz et al. (2012) proposed dividing the 
continuum into 19 values.  
Moreover, since values form an integrated structure, the associations 
between values and other variables should follow a specific pattern. 
Therefore, the theory can be used to generate integrated hypotheses: if a 
Personal values 
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specific variable is associated positively with a particular value, it should be 
associated positively also with adjacent values and negatively with values on 
the opposite side of the value circle. The remaining relationships should 
decrease moving around the value structure in either direction from the 
highest (i.e., strongest positive) association towards the lowest (i.e., strongest 
negative) association. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Theoretical value structure, adapted from Schwartz (1992). 
There is much support for both the content and structure of Schwartz’s 
(1992) theory of basic human values (Schwartz, 2012; Schwartz et al., 2001). 
The analyses of data from wide-ranging samples (including data from 
representative national samples and specific groups) from 82 countries 
support the idea that values are arranged into a motivational continuum 
(Schwartz, 2012). However, some evidence suggests that the data does not 
match the theoretical value structure equally well in all samples (Davidov, 
2008; Steinmetz, Isidor, & Baeuerle, 2012), and that such a lack of fit is 
found especially in samples from socioeconomically less developed countries 
(Strack & Dobewall, 2012). Recent studies have found support for different 
central assumptions of the theory, including the relative importance of 
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different values for an individual (Bilsky et al., 2015), and the arrangement of 
values according to Schwartz’s value circle within individuals (Borg, Bardi, & 
Schwartz, 2015). Further, values are relatively stable, but when intra-
individual value change occurs, it seems to follow the theoretical structure in 
that an increase in importance of one value is accompanied by increases in 
importance of adjacent values and decreases in importance of conflicting 
values (Bardi, Lee, Hofmann-Towfigh, & Soutar, 2009). Novel research 
further suggests that children's and adolescents’ value structures are similar 
to those of adults and follow Schwartz’s model (Döring, Daniel, & Knafo-
Noam, 2016). 
2.2 TRUTH-RELATED VALUES: RATIONAL AND NON-
RATIONAL TRUTH 
While the focus in Schwartz’s model (Schwartz, 1992, Schwartz et al., 2012) is 
on the universal aspects (content and structure) of values, less is known 
about values that may be motivationally mixed and/or non-universal. 
However, some studies have considered values other than those in Schwartz's 
model, for example health (Aavik & Dobewall, 2016), honour (Helkama et al., 
2013), work values (Myyry & Helkama, 2001), education (Portman, 2014) 
and truth (Wach & Hammer, 2003a, 2003b). The present study includes two 
truth-related values proposed by Wach and Hammer (2003a, 2003b, pp. 
123–146), namely rational truth and non-rational truth. Wach and Hammer 
argue that these values represent two opposing sides of truth: rational truth 
concerns theoretical, logical and predictable truth4, whereas non-rational 
truth involves belief in magic, intuitiveness, fatalism and the denial of 
rationality. According to Wach and Hammer (2003b, pp. 137–138), rational 
truth corresponds to Weber’s (1919/1970) ideas about intellectualist 
rationalization created by science, whereas non-rational truth parallels with 
that which gives meaning to the world.  
As regards the location of the truth values in Schwartz’s value structure, 
Wach and Hammer (2003b) hypothesised that rational truth would be 
located between self-direction and universalism. Indeed, their results from 
six European countries indicated that rational truth always emerged near 
self-direction—as a distinct region, as a subregion of self-direction or 
intermixed with self-direction—leading them to conclude that rational truth 
could be a subtype of self-direction. Furthermore, in line with their 
hypothesis, Wach and Hammer observed that universalism values were also 
adjacent to rational truth, although at the same time, were often intermixed 
with benevolence. Regarding non-rational truth, Wach and Hammer (2003b) 
hypothesised that it would be located between power and security. They 
                                                 
4 See Niiniluoto (1990) for a related discussion of epistemic values (knowledge, truth, 
truthlikeness, information) in the context of science. 
Personal values 
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tested this only in one country (France) and found that non-rational truth 
emerged closest to security, positioned in a region between security and 
power. Study I of the present dissertation examines the location of truth 
values in Schwartz’s (1992) value structure in Finland and whether it 
corresponds to that observed by Wach and Hammer (2003b) in other 
European countries. 
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3 STANCES TOWARDS EXPERT 
KNOWLEDGE 
An (epistemic) expert can be defined as “a person who is capable of providing 
strong justifications for a range of claims in a domain” (Weinstein, 1993, p. 
71) or someone who not only has extensive knowledge in some domain, but 
who is also able to generate new knowledge in response to new questions in 
that domain (Goldman, 2001). For instance, researchers, when acting as 
experts, often need to answer or comment on new questions they have not 
chosen themselves (Nowotny, 2003; see also Albaek et al., 2003). The term 
authority is closely related to the term expert, even though these concepts are 
not identical. For example, Pirttilä-Backman (1993, p. 22) noted that “the 
term expert would always be translated into Finnish as asiantuntija and 
authority as either auktoriteetti or asiantuntija”.  
According to Kelman and Hamilton (1989, pp. 54–55), authority refers to 
a role relationship5 involving the holder of an authority position and the 
subordinate, which entitles the former to make demands on the latter, 
whereas the latter has the duty to obey. This relationship is not based merely 
on power, but on the perceived legitimacy, that is, a subordinate’s acceptance 
of the authority’s right to give orders (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989, pp. 55–56). 
It is also useful to differentiate between bureaucratic and professional 
authority (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989, pp. 128-129). While the legitimacy of 
the former’s authority is derived from their position in the hierarchy, that of 
the latter’s is based on their knowledge and skills. Professional authorities 
(e.g., medical doctors) can make requests, but do not have the right to 
demand their client (e.g., a patient) to obey. Therefore, according to Kelman 
and Hamilton (1989, pp. 128–129), the relationship between a professional 
and a client is based on preference rather than obligation, that is, a client’s 
choice of whether or not to follow a professional’s recommendation is based 
on that client’s considerations of such issues as whether doing so is beneficial 
to her or him. However, there are also similarities between these two types of 
authorities. For example, bureaucratic authority often requires certain 
professional skills and professional authority is often accompanied by a high 
hierarchical position (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989, pp. 128–129).  
Stevanovic and Peräkylä (2012) differentiated between the epistemic and 
the deontic dimensions of authority, where the former concerns knowledge 
and the latter concerns rights and obligations. They (Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 
2012, p. 298) stated that “epistemic authority is about knowing how the 
world ‘is’; deontic authority is about determining how the world ‘ought to 
                                                 
5 It is also worth noting that the word authority sometimes refers to the person or institution that 
has authority, whereas other times it refers to the normative power of the person or institution 
(Zagzebski, 2012, p. 103). 
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be’”. Lindström and Weatherall (2015, p. 51) described these two dimensions 
of authority in the context of medicine as follows: “In the deontic domain the 
doctors’ stance—their right and obligation to recommend courses of 
treatment—is grounded in their epistemic authority as experts in medicine. 
However, the ultimate deontic authority resides with patients as they have 
the irrevocable right to refuse a treatment.” 
This dissertation views the concept of expert widely to include both 
experts and authorities, such as teachers and superiors (for a review on the 
concepts of expert and authority, see Pirttilä-Backman, 1993; for a discussion 
on the concept of epistemic authority, see Zagzebski, 2012). The authority 
positions of teachers and superiors can be considered as containing elements 
of both bureaucratic and professional or epistemic authority. First, both 
positions are based on a legitimate role relationship in which the person 
holding the upper position is entitled to make demands that the subordinate 
(student or employee) should follow. Second, both positions require certain 
knowledge (particularly the position of a teacher) and skills.  
In this study, following Scholz (2009), the term layperson is used to refer 
generally to non-expert relative to a particular domain. Non-expert and 
novice are terms that are often used interchangeably with the term 
layperson, although finer distinctions could also be made, for example by 
differentiating between an ignoramus—a non-expert in specific domain 
without a future prospect of becoming an expert in that domain—and a 
novice—currently a non-expert in a domain, but with a prospect of becoming 
an expert in that domain at some point in the future (Scholz, 2009).  
Stances towards experts as well as the relationship between laypeople and 
experts have been addressed in various domains and contexts such as 
philosophy, personal epistemology, public understanding of science (PUS), 
and health care and medicine. Further, upward dissent or expressing one’s 
views to others in higher positions has been studied in the organisational 
domain, and in the context of education. 
3.1 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAYPEOPLE AND 
EXPERTS 
The relationship between scientific and technological experts and the public 
(or laypeople) has been discussed in the context of the field of PUS, and 
mainly using two contrasting approaches. First, the deficit model sees the 
relationship between scientific experts and laypeople as a hierarchical one-
way communication process in which the experts’ task is to educate the 
illiterate or ignorant laypeople about scientific facts (Miller, 2001; Sturgis & 
Allum, 2004). It assumes that laypeople’s possible fears or doubts about 
scientific innovations or scientific experts’ advice result from not 
understanding the scientific reasoning behind them (Hansen, Holm, Frewer, 
Robinson, & Sandøe, 2003; Sturgis & Allum, 2004). In contrast, the 
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contextual approach takes into account the contexts in which people 
encounter scientific experts’ knowledge claims and contexts in which people 
use knowledge (Wynne, 1991; Yearley, 2000). People may make judgements 
about the trustworthiness of scientific claims based on their previous 
knowledge and experience of the issue and of the institution providing the 
claims (Wynne, 1991; Yearley, 2000). Further, people may be motivated to 
gain scientific understanding of issues that are relevant to them, interpret 
scientific knowledge in relation to other forms of knowledge and, also, 
consult sources other than scientific ones for advice (Wynne, 1991).  
However, people may lack sufficient motivation to make such efforts, but 
may also rely on heuristics or shortcuts such as deference to scientific 
authority (Brossard & Nisbet, 2007). Deference has been studied in contexts 
of scientific and technological controversies, for example biotechnology 
(Brossard & Nisbet, 2007), and it refers to “an individual’s likelihood to 
believe, or at least accept, information from scientific sources” (Binder, 
Hillback, & Brossard, 2016, p. 835). 
From a philosophical perspective, some of the possible sources or origins 
of knowledge include perception, introspection, memory, reason, and 
testimony (Steup, 2015). Generally, much of what people accept as 
knowledge is testimonial—it is based on other people’s knowledge 
(Kutrovátz, 2010). Therefore, learning from other people is a crucial part of 
producing and spreading knowledge (Chinn, Buckland, & Samarapungavan, 
2011). This is especially true in domains in which laypeople need to rely on 
experts, because they themselves lack the relevant background knowledge 
and understanding needed to evaluate the merits of knowledge claims 
(Bromme, Thomm, & Wolf, 2015; Hendriks, Kienhues, & Bromme, 2015). In 
cases in which laypeople are unable to assess the veracity of a knowledge 
claim directly (i.e., an assessment based on first-hand evaluations, including 
personal experience and knowledge, or thinking critically about the 
properties of the claim), they may need to rely on an indirect or second-hand 
evaluation, and transform the question “what is true” into “whom to believe” 
(Bromme et al., 2015; Hendriks et al., 2015). Medical knowledge serves as an 
example of a domain in which the role of sources is important, because 
laypeople rarely have enough knowledge of their own to really understand 
most medical topics (Kienhues & Bromme, 2012). 
When deciding which expert to rely on, laypeople need to consider 
experts’ epistemic trustworthiness (Hendriks et al., 2015; see also 
Cummings, 2014a, 2014b). Building on earlier theorisation and empirical 
research, Hendriks et al. (2015) proposed that epistemic trustworthiness 
consists of three dimensions: judgements of an expert’s expertise 
(competence or ability); an expert’s integrity (honesty, objectivity, and 
adherence to scientific standards); and an expert’s benevolence (good 
intentions). Hendriks et al. (2015) suggest that whether epistemic 
trustworthiness leads to actual epistemic trust is an empirical question. They 
propose that “actual epistemic trust would be indicated for example if a 
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layperson would actually follow the advice of an expert or if she would turn to 
the expert for further information” (Hendriks et al., 2015, p. 17). The present 
study examines such cases of laypeople’s epistemic trust: following the advice 
of doctors, and turning to health-care experts (or other health practitioners) 
for advice or treatment.  
Approaching laypeople’s stances towards expert knowledge from a 
different perspective, qualitative and quantitative studies have addressed 
laypeople’s explanations for disagreement between experts concerning 
specific scientific topics, including medicine, food additives, and climate 
change (Bromme et al., 2015; Kajanne & Pirttilä-Backman, 1999; Thomm, 
Hentschke, & Bromme, 2015), and forecasts in different domains 
(Dieckmann et al., 2015). Laypeople’s explanations for expert disagreement 
were found to be related to the general difficulty in obtaining scientific 
knowledge, including the features of the research process and the 
phenomenon being studied; experts’ potential material and immaterial 
interests; and experts’ characteristics and background (Bromme et al., 2015; 
Kajanne & Pirttilä-Backman, 1999). 
3.2 UPWARD DISSENT: READINESS TO QUESTION 
EXPERTS’ AND AUTHORITIES’ VIEWS 
Studies have addressed people’s general willingness to argue or 
argumentativeness, which Infante and Rancer (1982) conceptualised as a 
trait comprising the interaction between the tendency to approach and to 
avoid arguments. For instance, Nussbaum and Bendixen (2003) found that 
the need for cognition and assertiveness were associated with a tendency to 
approach arguments, whereas particular epistemological beliefs (i.e., certain 
and simple knowledge), low levels of assertiveness and high levels of warmth 
were associated with avoiding arguments. Schommer-Aikins and Easter 
(2009) found that individuals who defined argument as constructive 
communication were more willing to argue than those people who defined 
argument as verbal aggression. 
In the field of argumentation studies, Paglieri and Castelfranchi (2010) 
suggested that the strategic dimension of arguing should be taken into 
account when discussing an individual’s willingness to argue, and proposed 
that this dimension include the individual’s consideration of the benefits, 
costs and dangers of arguing. They stated that among the possible benefits 
are the goals that the individual is trying to achieve by arguing, be they 
dialogical (e.g., to persuade the other party of one’s claim) or extra-dialogical 
(e.g., to gain something by having persuaded the other party). Further, they 
noted that engaging in argumentation has a potentially negative side: costs 
may include, for instance, social exposure and the time invested. Moreover, it 
may involve such dangers as not resolving but instead deepening the 
disagreement. These ideas somewhat resemble those of Infante and Rancer 
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(1982, p. 46), who stressed the importance of taking into account the 
individual’s situational “perceptions of the probability and importance of 
success and failure in a particular argumentative situation”.  
In the organisational domain, employee voice and silence refer to whether 
employees intentionally express or withhold their work-related ideas, 
suggestions, opinions, concerns and information about possible changes or 
improvements in work organisations (Morrison, 2014; Van Dyne, Ang, & 
Botero, 2003). Respectively, upward voice refers to expressing such work-
related ideas and suggestions to a supervisor or someone else in a higher 
organisational position (for a review, see Morrison, 2014). Upward dissent 
(Kassing, 1997) is a specific form of upward employee voice that has been 
addressed in fewer studies and it is of particular interest for the present 
dissertation.  
According to Kassing (1997), organisational dissent generally concerns 
employees’ expression of disagreements and contradictory opinions. One of 
its forms, upward dissent (or articulated dissent), refers to expressing such 
dissent to management or supervisors (Kassing, 1997). In Kassing’s (1997) 
conceptualisation, dissent begins with a triggering event (i.e., experiencing 
dissent), after which an employee may decide to express their dissent to an 
upward (or to some other) audience. The types and focus of dissent-
triggering events can vary and include topics related to employee treatment, 
organisational change, decision making, inefficiency of work practices and 
processes, work role and responsibilities, resources, unethical practices, 
performance evaluation, and preventing harm (Kassing & Armstrong, 2002). 
Dissent-triggering issues may be focussed on self, on others or concern the 
whole organisation (Kassing & Armstrong, 2002). The decision of whether or 
not to express dissent is made in light of different individual, relational and 
organisational factors that affect an employee’s perceptions of whether their 
dissent will be perceived as adversarial or constructive and whether it 
involves a risk of evoking retaliation (Kassing, 1997). Individual factors 
concern the characteristics of the employees, such as their predispositions or 
traits, affiliation with the organisation and organisational position; relational 
factors involve the types and quality of relationships people have within 
organisations; and organisational factors refer to employees’ perceptions of 
whether the organisational climate generally supports or impedes 
expressions of dissent (for reviews of empirical studies concerning these 
factors, see Kassing, 1997, 2008).  
Milliken, Morrison, and Hewlin (2003) proposed a model of employee 
silence that shares many elements with Kassing’s (1997) model. Milliken et 
al.’s (2003) model includes not only personal, organisational, and 
relationship characteristics that affect an employee’s decision to remain 
silent (instead of speaking up), but also considerations of potential negative 
outcomes and whether speaking up will make any difference (or is futile). 
They view the first three factors as “exogenous to the decision process but as 
having an effect on how an employee will view the potential outcomes 
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associated with raising a concern” (Milliken et al., 2003, p. 1468). In their 
interview study among employees, Milliken et al. (2003) found that various 
fears and worries were central to employees’ decisions for not expressing 
their concerns at work to those above them. These anticipated negative 
outcomes involved such fears and concerns as being labelled or viewed 
negatively, damaging relationships with others, retaliation or punishment, or 
negatively impacting others. In her review on employee voice and silence, 
Morrison (2014) noted that the importance of employees’ safety and efficacy 
considerations in deciding whether to speak up or not is a recurring theme 
among studies on voice and silence. Indeed, upward dissent is more likely to 
be expressed when employees think that it is safe (not risky) and has an 
effect (is not futile). However, Morrison (2014) pointed out that silence 
especially may not always involve such calculations of costs and benefits, but 
may stem from more automatic or non-conscious processes. Further, she 
proposed that antecedents of employee voice and silence may be clustered 
into two more general groups—motivators and inhibitors. 
Applying Kassing’s (1997) model of organisational dissent to the context 
of education, Goodboy (2011, p. 423) proposed that instructional dissent 
“occurs when students express their disagreements or complaints about 
class-related issues”. In their study of university students’ reasons for not 
complaining to their professor about an incident about which they were 
dissatisfied, Bolkan and Goodboy (2013) found that the majority of reasons 
concerned a lack of efficacy (i.e., thinking that complaining would not change 
or fix anything), which they considered as an organisational factor. They 
grouped the other reasons under the categories of personal factors (thinking 
that complaining is not worth the effort, seeing the problem as their own 
fault, embarrassed to mention it, did not know how to complain), relational 
factors (unapproachable teachers, feeling that complaining is inappropriate, 
preferring to manage their instructors' impressions of them) and 
organisational factors (a fear of retaliation).  
Focussing particularly on knowledge-related disagreements, Pirttilä-
Backman and Keso (1998; Keso, 2002) studied Finnish university students’ 
reasons for not having disagreed with their teachers or other experts in 
knowledge-related matters. One group of these reasons concerned 
knowledge or knowing (i.e. feelings of ignorance, trust in the teacher’s 
expertise, or thinking that teachers provide only opinions, not knowledge), 
whereas another group of reasons concerned a person, situation or stance 
(i.e. considering debate as uninteresting or unimportant, seldom meeting 
teachers or experts, or considering the university atmosphere or “mass 
lectures” as lacking adequate support for expressing own views). Laypeople’s 
reasons for not disagreeing with experts or for not expressing disagreement 
with them are examined in Study I of the present dissertation.  
Study I also addresses the relationship between personal values and 
laypeople’s readiness to question experts’ views (RQEV). Numerous studies 
have addressed the relationship of values with other variables and have 
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found personal values to be associated with a range of attitudes (Boer & 
Fischer, 2013), behavioural intentions, and behaviours (Bardi & Schwartz, 
2003; Miles, 2015; Roccas & Sagiv, 2010). Even though values have been 
rarely included in studies examining stances towards expert knowledge, 
there is some evidence pointing to their relevance in such contexts. 
Regarding RQEV, values have been found to be associated with such related 
variables as trust in institutions (Devos et al., 2002; Morselli et al., 2012) and 
authoritarian submission (Passini, 2015). In these studies, values were 
conceptualised and measured using Schwartz’s theory and measurement 
instruments. A common finding of these studies is that openness-to-change 
values tend to be negatively associated with trust in institutions (Devos et al., 
2002; Morselli et al., 2012) and with submission to authority (i.e. passive 
obedience to authority; Passini, 2015), whereas conservation values tend to 
be positively associated. Therefore, individuals who prioritise openness to 
change may be more prepared to question experts’ views, whereas those who 
value conservation may be less prepared to do so. On the basis of the 
motivational goals of values, rational truth appears to be particularly 
compatible with RQEV because of its focus on finding the truth, and likewise, 
self-direction and stimulation are compatible with RQEV since they are 
based on the motivation to pursue independence, new ideas and change. In 
contrast, security, conformity and tradition are less compatible with 
questioning experts’ views because they emphasise the preservation of the 
status quo, self-restriction, and order.  
Study I of the present dissertation examines these assumptions using 
population-based survey data from Finland. Therefore, it is important to 
consider some particularities of the Finnish context. As regards cultural 
values, Finland is characterised by an emphasis on intellectual autonomy, 
egalitarianism, harmony, and by low hierarchy and embeddedness 
(Schwartz, 2006a) as well as a low power distance (Hofstede, 2001). On the 
other hand, Finland is characterised by a relatively widespread trust in 
institutions and public authorities (European Commission, 2015). Therefore, 
these characteristics of the Finnish context could both enhance and hinder 
RQEV. 
3.3 PATIENT NON-ADHERENCE TO DOCTORS’ 
INSTRUCTIONS 
As noted above, this dissertation addresses two examples of epistemic trust 
in experts proposed by Hendriks et al. (2015), namely that a layperson 
follows an expert’s advice or turns to the expert for further information. Both 
of these examples are studied in the context of health—following a medical 
expert’s advice and turning to a medical expert or another health practitioner 
for advice or treatment. The first of these, patient adherence, is defined as 
“the extent to which patients follow the instructions they are given for 
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prescribed treatments” (Haynes, Ackloo, Sahota, McDonald, & Yao, 2008, p. 
2), whereas non-adherence “describes the failure of a patient to follow 
recommended health behaviours and treatment advice given by the clinician” 
(DiMatteo, Haskard-Zolnierek, & Martin, 2012, p. 74). Vrijens et al. (2012) 
describe adherence as a process having three components—initiation, 
implementation, and discontinuation. Accordingly, they note that non-
adherence can emerge at any of these stages: patients may not start the 
prescribed treatment at all or start it late, their actual dosing may not 
correspond to the prescribed dosing regimen, and they may end the 
treatment too early. Finally, persistence refers to the length of time between 
initiation and discontinuation (starting and ending) of the prescribed 
treatment (Vrijens et al., 2012).  
Compliance is a term that has been often used interchangeably with 
adherence, but these terms have different connotations. The term adherence 
is considered as less judgemental, as having fewer connotations of patient 
submission and passive obedience, and as better able to capture the idea of 
cooperation in the patient-doctor relationship (Lerner, Gulick, & Dubler, 
1998; Vermeire, Hearnshaw, Van Royen, & Denekens, 2001; Vrijens et al., 
2012; World Health Organization, 2003). Therefore, the term adherence is 
used in this dissertation. It is, however, worth noting that the term adherence 
has been criticised on the same grounds as compliance: as exaggerating the 
doctor’s control (Lerner et al., 1998; Steiner & Earnest, 2000); as failing to 
see the patient’s behaviour as being their own legitimate choice (Lerner, 
1997); as suggesting that the patient needs to follow the prescription exactly 
as directed to gain benefit (Steiner & Earnest, 2000); and as potentially 
stigmatising patients who fail to do so (Lerner et al., 1998; Osterberg & 
Blaschke, 2005).  
Undeniably, non-adherence may be rational in some situations and lead 
to better outcomes for the patient—for example in cases of errors of diagnosis 
or treatment (DiMatteo, 2004; see also Donovan & Blake, 1992). This 
notwithstanding, non-adherence is considered as a major health problem 
because it makes treatment less effective, which in turn contributes to 
increased morbidity, mortality, and health care costs, therefore affecting both 
quality of life and health economics (Hugtenburg, Timmers, Elders, Vervloet, 
& van Dijk, 2013; Osterberg & Blaschke, 2005; World Health Organization, 
2003). In contrast, higher rates of adherence can lead to an improved health 
status of patients and yield economic benefits, for example by reduced use of 
medical resources (Krueger, Berger, & Felkey, 2005; World Health 
Organization, 2003).  
As regards the rates of non-adherence, a meta-analysis of patient 
adherence across 569 studies found that on average 24.8% of all patients 
were non-adherent (DiMatteo, 2004). However, non-adherence rates vary 
depending on the diseases, treatment regimens (e.g., medication vs non-
medication), and methods of measuring adherence (objective vs subjective 
measures, e.g., pill count vs self-report) (DiMatteo, 2004). For example, non-
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adherence rates tend to be higher for chronic than acute conditions 
(Osterberg & Blaschke, 2005).  
Empirical studies have identified hundreds of factors that may be 
associated with adherence (Kardas, Lewek, & Matyjaszczyk, 2013; Vermeire 
et al., 2001). However, comparing and synthesising the results of different 
studies is complicated due to the variation in definitions and methods of 
measuring adherence across the studies (Krueger et al., 2005; Vermeire et 
al., 2001) or due to a lack of a clear definition of adherence (Kardas et al., 
2013). In their systematic review of 51 systematic reviews, Kardas et al. 
(2013) grouped determinants of adherence into five categories. They found 
that of the socio-economic factors they analysed, family and social support 
were positively associated with adherence, whereas lack of such support, as 
well as the social stigma of a disease were negatively associated. Moreover, 
economic factors such as costs, other financial constraints, and low socio-
economic status contributed to non-adherence (though socio-economic 
status was unrelated in some reviews). Many different healthcare system 
factors were associated with non-adherence, including poor access to health 
care (though unrelated in some reviews), poor information about drug 
administration, poor relationship and communication between healthcare 
provider and patient, and poor follow-up. In addition to certain diagnoses, 
other condition-related factors were also associated with adherence. For 
example, absence of symptoms and clinical improvement were negatively 
associated with adherence, whereas disease severity was positively associated 
(or unrelated in some reviews). Furthermore, treatments that are less 
patient-friendly yielded lower adherence rates. Examples of such therapy-
related factors are frequent dosing, presence of adverse effects, drug 
effectiveness, longer duration of the treatment, and drug type. Finally, the 
relationships between many patient-related factors and adherence were 
inconsistent across reviews, particularly as regards such demographic factors 
as age, gender, educational level, marital status, and ethnicity. Different 
health beliefs as well as knowledge of disease and treatment were also 
associated with adherence, as were different psychological factors (e.g., self-
efficacy). Further, forgetfulness, as well as drug or alcohol dependence were 
associated with non-adherence as were psychiatric conditions, although the 
effects of comorbidities and patient history were generally inconsistent. 
According to Vermeire et al. (2001, p. 340), adherence research should 
focus “on the reasons and motivations for the medication-taking behaviour”. 
Whether values feature among such motivations has been rarely addressed in 
studies on patient adherence. Some studies, however, have examined the role 
of personal values or important life goals in the context of adherence. Two 
previous studies used value scales devised particularly for those studies but 
they both mention Schwartz’s value theory as one of the sources they used for 
building their value scales. Gauchet et al. (2007) asked HIV patients to rate 
the importance of different values to them. They found that valuing other 
people (tolerance, respectfulness, and understanding toward others) was 
Stances towards expert knowledge 
28 
associated with greater adherence as was also valuing “God and children” 
(starting a family, seeing the children grow up, believing in a god). They 
argue that these values may be related to social support that is known to be 
associated with adherence (e.g., Kardas et al., 2013). Further, they observed 
that valuing success (having a good job, being competitive and wealth) and 
sexuality (continuing to have sex, pleasure, love) were not associated with 
adherence.  
Zhang et al. (2015) examined the associations of life goals with adherence 
among heart failure patients. Both health related and non-health related 
goals were considered, namely, heart failure symptom relief, physical 
wellbeing, social relationships, autonomy, and hedonism. The results 
indicated that the rated importance of different life goals was not associated 
with adherence. However, the extent to which the respondents considered 
life goals as compatible with self-care recommendations was associated with 
adherence in one of the three studied regimens. More specifically, 
considering important life goals as compatible with physical activity was 
associated with better adherence to exercise recommendations, whereas 
compatibility of life goals with dietary and weighing recommendations was 
not associated with adherence to these respective regimens (i.e., dietary 
restriction and daily weighing). In their review of the role of values in self-
care decision-making among heart-failure patients, Karimi and Clark (2016) 
noted that sometimes patients felt that by following self-care 
recommendations they were unable to act according to an important value.  
On the basis of the above, it appears that personal values are a potentially 
important, but thus far largely neglected, factor associated with non-
adherence. For an individual, adherence or non-adherence might be a way of 
pursuing particular values. The opposition between openness-to-change and 
conservation values seem particularly relevant in the context of adherence. 
Individuals for whom openness-to-change values are important may be less 
likely to adhere to doctors’ instructions because non-adherence can be a way 
for them to pursue individual thought and action and provide excitement and 
challenge. By contrast, people who value conservation are motivated by self-
restriction, order, and stability—goals that may be more compatible with 
adherence. Study II examines these propositions. 
3.4 SEEKING HEALTH ADVICE OR TREATMENT FROM 
CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL 
PRACTITIONERS 
When individuals experience health symptoms or negative changes in their 
health, and need health advice or treatment, they may ponder who will best 
answer their questions. This study considers two such sources of health 
advice or treatment that people may turn to—experts within conventional 
medicine (also referred to as Western or biomedicine; Wootton & Sparber, 
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2001) and practitioners of complementary and alternative medicine (CAM). 
The World Health Organization (2000) defines CAM as “a broad set of health 
care practices that are not part of that country's own tradition and are not 
integrated into the dominant health care system”. CAM treatments may be 
used in conjunction with conventional medicine (i.e., complementary) or 
instead of it (i.e., alternative) (Caspi, Koithan, & Criddle, 2004), with the 
former being more common (Hildreth & Elman, 2007). 
Individuals’ choices in seeking health advice may depend on a number of 
factors including not only socio-demographic (e.g., age, gender, education, 
income) and health-related variables, but also social and psychological 
variables (e.g., social support, personality, world views and beliefs), as well as 
sociological factors (e.g., cultural context) (Stratton & McGivern-Snofsky, 
2008). CAM users and users of conventional medicine are characterised by 
somewhat similar attributes and thus it is not easy to differentiate between 
them on the basis of socio-demographic and health-related factors (Hildreth 
& Elman, 2007). The common characteristics include such factors as female 
gender, higher education, and poor health (Hildreth & Elman, 2007), 
although it should be noted that not all findings were consistent across 
different studies (Bishop & Lewith, 2010). Further, old age (but also very 
young age) is associated with more frequent use of conventional medicine 
(Bishop & Lewith, 2010; Hildreth & Elman, 2007), while CAM users are 
more likely to be young or middle-aged (Bishop & Lewith, 2010; Ernst, 2000; 
Frass et al., 2012), although the effects of age are difficult to compare across 
studies of CAM use that included different age ranges (Bishop & Lewith, 
2010).  
Regarding (social) psychological factors, studies that have examined the 
role of values, world views, personality traits or perceptions of the self in the 
context of conventional or complementary and alternative health care 
utilisation are the most relevant for the present study. Of these, the 
relationships of personality traits have been studied the most extensively, 
particularly openness to experience. Several studies observed a positive 
association between openness to experience and more frequent or more 
varied use of CAM treatments and consultations with CAM practitioners 
(Hildreth & Elman, 2007; Honda & Jacobson, 2005; Sirois & Purc-
Stephenson, 2008) and, also, with having used CAM (Thomson, Jones, 
Browne, & Leslie, 2014a). Further, new and infrequent users of 
complementary medicine scored higher on openness than conventional 
medicine users (Sirois & Gick, 2002). However, openness to experience was 
not consistently associated with use of either CAM or conventional medicine 
across all studies or when measured differently within a particular sample. 
For example, openness to experience was not associated with the number of 
conventional health service visits, did not distinguish CAM users from non-
users (Hildreth & Elman, 2007), was not associated with an intention to try 
CAM before conventional medicine (Thomson et al., 2014b), and was not 
associated with CAM usage (Furnham, 2007). It should be noted that the 
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measurement of openness to experience varied across these studies, and that 
some studies used a single item to measure it. As regards other personality 
traits, Honda and Jacobson (2005) found a negative association between 
extraversion and use of a particular type of CAM (mind–body therapy), and 
Sirois and Purc-Stephenson (2008) found that agreeableness was positively 
associated with the breadth and frequency of CAM consultations.  
To sum up, though not all findings concur, openness to experience tends 
to be associated with CAM use, and there is some evidence suggesting that 
those who scored lower in openness may rely more on conventional 
medicine. Openness-to-experience traits and openness-to-change values are 
conceptually similar and also empirically associated (Fischer & Boer, 2015; 
Parks-Leduc et al., 2015). They both involve the pursuit of new and 
stimulating ideas and actions (Fischer & Boer, 2015).  
CAM use was also found to be associated with perceiving oneself as 
unconventional (i.e., less conforming, traditional, habitual) (McGregor & 
Peay, 1996) and as being more likely to take risks (Sturm, 2000). Risk taking 
is somewhat similar to the motivating goals of stimulation (i.e., excitement 
and challenge in life), which is one of the openness-to-change values, 
whereas conventionality is similar to tradition and conformity, which are 
conservation values. Accordingly, individuals who prioritise openness-to-
change values may be more likely to use CAM and to prefer consulting CAM 
practitioners, whereas those valuing conservation may be more likely to 
prefer turning to conventional practitioners for advice or treatment. Study III 
tests these propositions.  
Personal values, per se, have been rarely considered in the context of 
preferences in seeking health advice, although the associations of different 
beliefs and belief systems with CAM use have been studied (for a review, see 
Bishop, Yardley, & Lewith, 2007). For example, Astin (1998) found that a 
specific combination of values and world views (including ecological 
sustainability, interest in the foreign and exotic, interest in women’s issues, 
altruism, self-actualisation, spirituality, social conscience and optimism) was 
associated with CAM use (having used some form of CAM within the 
previous year). On the basis of Astin’s results Saher and Lindeman (2005) 
hypothesised and found a positive (albeit small) association between valuing 
self-transcendence (vs. self-enhancement; measured using a short version of 
the Schwartz Value Survey) and believing in the efficacy of CAM treatments. 
Although Saher and Lindeman used Schwartz’s (1992) value theory, they 
included only one of its two main dimensions. Further, they measured CAM 
beliefs, not CAM use nor preferences in seeking health advice or treatment. 
Since Saher and Lindeman’s results suggest that individuals who endorse 
self-transcendence (over self-enhancement) may be more likely to use CAM 
or to prefer CAM practitioners’ advice, Study III considers this value 
dimension, as well.  
Studies II and III of the present dissertation use data from the European 
Social Survey (http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/) to examine the 
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relationships between values and stances towards expert knowledge in the 
context of health care. Study II uses data from the ESS round 2 (Jowell and 
the Central Co-ordinating Team, 2005) and Study III uses data from the ESS 
rounds 2 and 7 (European Social Survey, 2015). Each of these ESS rounds 
featured a different rotating module related to health. Neither of these 
modules have been included in any other ESS rounds.  
ESS round 2 included items measuring two aspects of patient non-
adherence—non-adherent views and behaviour. Only non-adherent 
behaviour has been studied previously using the ESS round 2 data. More 
specifically, Larsen, Stovring, Kragstrup, and Hansen (2009) and 
Stavropoulou (2011) examined the associations between various 
sociodemographic variables and non-adherent behaviour, the latter of which 
was measured by the respondents’ self-reports of their behaviour in response 
to a medical prescription (the extent to which respondents used the medicine 
as prescribed by a doctor). In addition to demographics, Stavropoulou (2011) 
included items measuring respondents’ general perceptions of the doctor–
patient relationship and whether they thought they have generally enough 
choice regarding choosing their general practitioner (GP). Neither of these 
studies included personal values, and thus the current study adds to these by 
including both non-adherent views and behaviour and by examining 
personal values in the context of patient non-adherence (Study II). 
In addition to the two items above, ESS round 2 featured items measuring 
preferences in seeking health advice or treatment (hypothetical symptom 
scenarios), and ESS round 7 included items on the use of different forms of 
CAM. Grosse Frie, Eikemo, and Von Dem Knesebeck (2010) used data from 
ESS round 2 to study the relationships between education and a preference 
to consult a doctor across different symptom scenarios but they did not 
include personal values. 
Study III adds to the existing literature by including Schwartz’s (1992) 
two main value dimensions—conservation vs. openness to change and self-
transcendence vs. self-enhancement; by examining the associations of these 
dimensions with CAM use and with preferring to seek health advice or 
treatment from doctors on one hand and from other practitioners on the 
other; and by using data from a range of European countries collected at two 
time-points.  
A further main contribution of Study III is that it considers the context of 
specific countries by including a particular country-level factor. This factor, 
personal freedom, or opportunity in Porter, Stern and Green’s (2015) terms, 
refers to the extent to which citizens of a particular country have personal 
rights, ability to make their own choices and reach their potential, have 
access to advanced education and are not being restricted by prejudices or 
hostilities (Porter et al., 2015). People living in countries characterised by a 
higher level of personal freedom may prefer consulting other practitioners 
and to use CAM treatments for their health more, whereas people living in 
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countries with less personal freedom may rely more on conventional medical 
experts. 
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4 AIMS OF THE STUDY 
The main aim of this thesis is to examine the role of personal value priorities 
in the stances of individuals towards expert knowledge. As the reviewed 
literature indicates, values have been rarely studied in this context, and 
therefore this study set out to explore the relationships of values with three 
different constructs that are taken to reflect stances towards expert 
knowledge: 1) readiness to question experts’ views, 2) non-adherence to 
doctors’ instructions, and 3) a preference for medical experts versus other 
practitioners for health advice or treatment. In addition to the ten values 
included in Schwartz’s (1992) value theory, this study incorporated two 
truth-related values—rational truth and non-rational truth—proposed by 
Wach and Hammer (2003b). On the basis of both the motivational goals of 
values and the results of previous studies, it was expected that the value 
dimension contrasting openness to change and conservation would be 
particularly relevant regarding stances towards expert knowledge.  
Study I examined the location of rational truth and non-rational truth in 
Schwartz’s value structure. On the basis of basis of Wach and Hammer’s 
(2003b) studies it was hypothesised that rational truth would be located 
closer to self-direction but also adjacent to self-transcendence values, and 
that non-rational truth would be located closer to security and adjacent to 
power (Hypothesis 1). The relationships between values and readiness to 
question experts’ views (RQEV) were also examined in Study I. It was 
hypothesised that self-direction, stimulation and rational truth would be 
positively associated with RQEV, and conversely, security, conformity and 
tradition negatively associated with RQEV (Hypothesis 2). Study I further 
explored people’s reasons for not disagreeing or not expressing disagreement 
with experts and the topics on which they have questioned experts’ views. 
Study II considered the relationships of values with two types of non-
adherence: non-adherent views and non-adherent behaviour in response to 
doctor’s instructions. It was expected that openness-to-change (vs. 
conservation) values would be positively associated with non-adherent views 
and behaviour (Hypothesis 3). 
Study III examined the associations of values with preferences in seeking 
health advice. It was hypothesised that endorsing conservation (vs. openness 
to change) would be positively associated with preferring doctors’ advice or 
treatment; negatively associated with preferring other practitioners; and 
negatively associated with use of CAM treatments (Hypothesis 4). It was also 
hypothesised that self-transcendence (vs. self-enhancement) would show 
secondary (i.e. smaller) and positive associations with the preference to 
consult other practitioners and with CAM use (Hypothesis 5). Moreover, it 
was expected that country-level personal freedom would be negatively 
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associated with preferring doctors' advice and positively associated with 
preferring other practitioners’ advice and with CAM use (Hypothesis 6). 
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5 METHODS 
5.1 PARTICIPANTS 
The current dissertation draws upon data from three different datasets. The 
first set was collected in 2010 using a postal survey questionnaire sent to 
1000 randomly sampled Finnish-speaking Finns who ranged in age from 15 
to 65 years (at the time of sampling) and lived in mainland Finland. Of the 
total of 326 returned questionnaires, six were unusable, and therefore, the 
final sample size was 320 respondents, of which 60.9% were women and 
38.4% men (two responses were missing), having an average age of 45.8 
years (SD = 14.9) (three responses were missing). This dataset was used in 
Study I. 
The other two datasets were collected by the European Social Survey 
(ESS) from representative samples of persons aged 15 and older using face-
to-face interviews. The data used in this dissertation are from ESS rounds 2 
and 7 (ESS Round 2: European Social Survey Round 2 Data, 2004; ESS 
Round 7: European Social Survey Round 7 Data, 2014), which were collected 
in 2004/2005 and 2014, respectively. Round 2 comprises 25 European 
countries and the first edition of round 7 comprises 15 countries. Studies II 
and III used data from the following 14 countries from ESS round 2: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland. 
Additionally, Study III used data from 12 countries from ESS round 7 (all of 
the countries listed above except Iceland and Luxembourg, neither of which 
participated). Countries were chosen on the basis of the results regarding the 
measurement (metric) invariance of the 21-item Portrait Values 
Questionnaire (PVQ), which is used in ESS to measure Schwartz’s (1992) ten 
basic values. These results indicate that it is possible to confidently measure 
human values and to study the associations between values and other 
constructs in these countries (Davidov, 2008, 2010; Davidov, Schmidt, & 
Schwartz, 2008). Response rates ranged from 43.6% (France) to 79.1% 
(Estonia) in ESS round 2 (European Social Survey, n.d.-a) and from 31.4% 
(Germany) to 65.8% (Poland) in ESS round 7 (European Social Survey, n.d.-
b). 
In Studies II and III, following Schwartz’s instructions on the ESS 
Education Net website (http://essedunet.nsd.uib.no/cms/topics/1/), 
respondents who had more than 5 values missing on the PVQ and those who 
chose the same response option for more than 16 PVQ items were excluded. 
After excluding such respondents (n = 1,605 for round 2 data; n = 587 for 
round 7 data) and 14-year-old respondents (n = 1 for round 2 data, n = 2 for 
round 7 data), the sample size was 24,262 for round 2 and 21,870 for round 
7. Similarly, in Study I, respondents who had omitted more than 30% of the 
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PVQ items (n = 3) were excluded from the analyses involving values (cf. 
Schwartz & Rubel, 2005). 
5.2 MEASURES 
5.2.1 VALUES 
The Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ; Schwartz, 2001; Schwartz et al., 
2001) was used to measure the ten basic values of Schwartz’s (1992) value 
theory. Each PVQ item describes a person in two sentences that are 
compatible with one basic value. Therefore, each of these verbal portraits 
refers implicitly to the importance of that value. For example, the following 
item measures conformity: “It is important to him/her always to behave 
properly. He/she wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong”. 
The respondent is asked to evaluate the similarity of the person described in 
the item to themselves using a Likert-type six-point scale, the endpoints of 
which are “not like me at all” and “very much like me”. The PVQ is gender 
matched with the respondent in languages that have different third person 
personal pronouns for males and females. Finnish, for example, has only one 
third person personal pronoun, and it is not gender specific, therefore only 
one version of PVQ was needed in the Finnish version of the questionnaire. 
Studies II and III used the 21-item PVQ that is used in the ESS to measure 
values. Study I used the Finnish translation of the 40-item PVQ (Koivula & 
Verkasalo, 2006). To measure rational truth and non-rational truth values, 
six items developed by Wach and Hammer (2003b, pp. 141–142) were added 
to the questionnaire. For example, one of the items measuring rational truth 
is as follows: “He/she thinks that it is always necessary to progress and to 
deepen one’s knowledge. What is true is important to him/her.” An 
exemplary item of non-rational truth is: “This person thinks that the reason 
does not lead to true knowledge. It is important to him/her to rely on nothing 
but his/her instinct when making important decisions.” Wach and Hammer’s 
(2003b) six items were translated from French to Finnish using a back-
translation procedure (however, translations from French to English are the 
author's). 
In Study I, a value score was computed for each of Schwartz’s ten values 
and Wach and Hammer’s two values. Cronbach’s alphas (α) were .76 for 
benevolence, .82 for universalism, .61 for self-direction, .76 for stimulation, 
.82 for hedonism, .88 for achievement, .76 for power, .65 for security, .68 for 
conformity, .47 for tradition, .71 for rational truth and .53 for non-rational 
truth.  
In Study II, four higher order values were created by computing a mean 
score for each ten values separately, and then averaging the values belonging 
to each higher order value (hedonism was included in self-enhancement) 
(Feather, 1995). Cronbach’s alphas for the pooled data from 14 countries 
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were .63 for openness to change, .73 for conservation, .70 for self-
enhancement, and .69 for self-transcendence. Within countries, Cronbach’s 
alphas ranged from .59 to .70 for openness to change; from .66 to .74 for 
conservation; from .66 to .81 for self-enhancement; and from .64 to .72 for 
self-transcendence. 
Studies II and III also used value dimension variables. In Study II, 
openness to change (vs. conservation) was computed by subtracting the 
mean of conservation from the mean of openness to change, and self-
enhancement (vs. self-transcendence) was computed by subtracting the 
mean of self-transcendence from the mean of self-enhancement (for studies 
using this procedure, see Feather, 1995; Vauclair et al., 2015). Study III used 
the weights devised by Verkasalo, Lönnqvist, Lipsanen and Helkama (2009) 
to compute two value dimensions—conservation and self-transcendence. 
Verkasalo et al. used data from ESS rounds 1 and 2 to calculate their weights, 
and concluded that the two-dimensional factor structure they obtained was 
extremely robust across these rounds. They reported a Cronbach’s alpha of 
.62 for the conservation dimension and of .54 for the self-enhancement 
dimension. Each value dimension variable reflects the relative importance 
that the respondent places on the values on one pole of the dimension as 
compared to values on the opposing pole of that same dimension. For 
instance, a high score on conservation indicates that the respondent values 
conservation relatively more than openness to change.  
Schwartz (1992) recommended controlling for the mean importance of 
values for an individual, which has become a common procedure in value 
research (Bardi, Buchanan, Goodwin, Slabu, & Robinson, 2014). In Studies I 
and II, value scores were centred around each respondent’s personal mean of 
all value items by subtracting the personal mean from the mean of items 
indexing a particular value (Schwartz, 2007). Such controlling for the mean 
importance of values is advisable, because it takes into account differences in 
the scale use between individuals, turns the value scores into value priorities 
and thus allows for assessing the relative importance instead of absolute 
importance of values for an individual, and produces more accurate and 
meaningful associations between values and other variables (Borg et al., 
2015; Parks-Leduc et al., 2015; Schwartz, 1992). Such centring was not 
necessary in Study III, because Verkasalo et al.’s (2009) dimensions include 
a control of response tendency. 
5.2.2 READINESS TO QUESTION EXPERTS’ VIEWS 
As regards readiness to question experts’ views, the respondents were 
provided with the following instruction adapted from Pirttilä-Backman and 
Keso (1998) and Keso (2002):  
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Recall a situation in which you disagreed with an expert (such as 
doctor, teacher, manager, subordinate) about some specific piece of 
information or knowledge-related matter. In case more than one 
situation comes to your mind, choose the one that has been the most 
important to you personally. Write briefly what it was about into the 
box below: From which field was the expert? What was the topic of 
your disagreement? How did the episode proceed? After that, 
respond to the questions below6. If you have never disagreed with an 
expert or never expressed a differing opinion, explain why in the box 
below.  
 
One third of a page was provided for a written response, and the length of the 
responses in handwritten Finnish ranged from one word to slightly exceeding 
the space provided. Overall 251 respondents provided a response, while 69 
did not. 
RQEV was inferred from these written accounts as follows. An initial 
categorisation and a coding manual of the relevant categories for the RQEV 
were formed based on a careful reading of accounts. In turn, the 
categorisation and the coding manual were piloted by the author and another 
researcher, who then discussed all the disagreements in coding, which led to 
some modifications in the coding manual and categorisation. The final 
categorisation of the RQEV consisted of seven categories. The intercoder 
reliability of the categorisation scheme was assessed by an independent 
coding of 17.5% of the 251 accounts, which resulted in a Cohen’s kappa of .89.  
These seven categories were further combined into three categories. The 
first category, clear RQEV (n = 162, coded as 1) comprised two types of 
accounts: those in which the respondent reported a particular disagreement 
incident with one or more experts (n = 145); and those in which the 
respondent expressed a critical stance towards experts or wrote that he or 
she has disagreed with them (n = 17). Likewise, the second category, 
emerging or no RQEV (n = 61, coded as 0), involved two types of accounts: 
those in which the respondent showed only some emerging criticism towards 
experts or expressed (sometimes indirectly) having had opinions of their own 
(n = 25); and those in which the respondent indicated not having disagreed 
or not having expressed disagreement with experts (it was sometimes 
impossible to clearly differentiate between these) or showed no critical stance 
towards them (n = 36). The third category, responses that cannot be 
interpreted (n = 28, coded as missing), involved three types of accounts: 
those that reported a disagreement but in which the opposing side was not 
mentioned, or in which it was unclear what roles were taken by the 
respondent and the opposing side (n = 15); accounts in which the respondent 
wrote that he or she could not recall any particular incident, could not say, or 
stated that he or she would skip the question or had no time to respond (n = 
                                                 
6 These questions were related to different aspects of the reported disagreement incident.  
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12); and one reported a disagreement in which the respondent played the 
role of an expert. 
Furthermore, the author perused all 251 accounts to identify accounts 
giving reasons for not disagreeing with experts or for not expressing 
disagreement with them. Both the accounts involving general comments (n = 
58) and the accounts including specific comments (relating to a particular 
disagreement with a particular expert, n = 5) were included (total n = 63). It 
was possible to place different parts of individual accounts into different 
categories in the categorisation system that was formed after several iterative 
rounds of categorisation. Finally, accounts in which the respondents reported 
a disagreement incident with an expert or with several experts (n = 145) were 
analysed to identify the topics of these disagreements. Each account was 
coded to only one main topic category. 
5.2.3 NON-ADHERENCE TO DOCTORS’ INSTRUCTIONS 
Non-adherence was measured using two self-reported single items available 
in the ESS round 2. The first item was related to views about non-adherence 
to doctors’ instructions. The respondent was asked to report her or his 
agreement with the statement “It is best to follow doctors’ orders” using a 
five-point Likert scale. This variable was non-normally distributed, with a 
skewness of −0.95 (SE = 0.02) and a kurtosis of 1.57 (SE = 0.04), and was 
therefore recoded into a binary variable: those responding “agree” or “agree 
strongly” were considered as adherent (coded as 0) and those responding 
“neither agree nor disagree”, “disagree” or “disagree strongly” were regarded 
as non-adherent (coded as 1). 
The second item was related to adherent vs. non-adherent behaviour and 
was measured by asking the respondent to “think back to the last time a 
doctor prescribed you a medicine you had not had before. Which statement 
on the card comes closest to what you did with this prescription?” Following 
Stavropoulou’s (2011) procedure, respondents were categorised as adherent 
(coded as 0) or as non-adherent (coded as 1): Those who chose the statement 
“I used the medicine exactly as prescribed” were regarded as adherent, 
whereas those who chose one of the following three statements were 
considered as non-adherent: “I didn’t collect the medicine from the 
pharmacy”, “I collected the medicine but didn’t use any of it”, or “I used some 
or all of the medicine but not exactly as prescribed”. Other responses 
(respondent was unable to remember the last occasion, had never had a 
prescription from a doctor, or provided another answer) were coded as 
missing.  
5.2.4 PREFERENCES IN SEEKING HEALTH ADVICE OR TREATMENT 
Preferences in seeking health advice or treatment were measured using the 
following items available in ESS rounds 2 and 7. In ESS round 2, the 
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respondents were asked who (nobody, friends or family, 
pharmacist/chemist/drug store, doctor, nurse, internet/web, medical 
helpline, other practitioner) they would go to first for advice or treatment in 
four symptom scenarios (very sore throat, serious headache, serious sleeping 
problems and serious backache). An exemplary item is: “Suppose you had a 
very sore throat. Who, if anyone, would you go to first for advice or 
treatment?” For the purposes of the present study, two count variables were 
constructed. The first, preferring doctors’ advice, indicates in how many of 
these four symptom scenarios (0–4) a respondent would turn to a doctor. 
Similarly, the second, preferring other practitioners’ advice, indicates the 
number of scenarios in which a respondent would turn to another 
practitioner. In ESS round 7, CAM use was measured by asking the 
respondents to indicate which of the listed 12 treatments they had used for 
their own health in the last 12 months: acupuncture, acupressure, Chinese 
medicine, chiropractics, osteopathy, homeopathy, herbal treatment, 
hypnotherapy, massage therapy, physiotherapy, reflexology, spiritual 
healing. For this study, a count variable was constructed to measure CAM 
use, that is, the number of treatments (0–12) a respondent reported having 
used.  
5.2.5 CONTROL VARIABLES 
In all three studies the effects of age, gender, and education were adjusted 
for. Age was used both as a continuous (Studies I and III) and as a categorical 
variable (Study II: ages: 15–39, 40–64, and 65–97). Education was also used 
both as a continuous (years of full time education; Studies II and III) and as a 
categorical variable (two groups: lower level, i.e. basic or upper secondary; 
and higher level, i.e. tertiary education; Study I). 
Study II further included marital status (married vs. not married), 
subjective general health (bad, very bad or fair health vs. good or very good 
health), and choice regarding GP (enough choice, vs. not enough choice). It 
also included the following two items in order to measure views about the 
doctor–patient relationship: “GPs treat their patients as their equals” and 
“Before doctors decide on a treatment, they discuss it with their patient.” 
Responses to those items reflected how often the respondent thought those 
apply to doctors in general, and were recoded into binary variables (those 
who thought that these statements usually apply to doctors vs. those who 
took the opposite view).  
Moreover, in Study II, country dummy variables were used to adjust for 
the possible country-specific effects in the 14 countries (for a similar 
procedure, see, e.g., Bünger, 2010). Thirteen country dummies were entered 
into the logistic regression analyses of the pooled data from 14 countries, 
each of which had a value of either 0 or 1 (Austria was the country of 
reference).  
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Study III also included a measure of subjective general health (1 = very bad; 5 
= very good)). In addition, it included a country-level variable indicating the 
level of personal autonomy, freedom and ability to progress in the country. 
This variable, opportunity, is one of the three dimensions comprising a 
recently developed indicator, the Social Progress Index, and comprises the 
following four components: personal rights; personal freedom and choice; 
tolerance and inclusion; and access to advanced education (Porter et al., 
2015; for a methodological report, see Stern, Wares, & Orzell, 2015). 
5.3 STATISTICAL ANALYSES 
Study I used ordinal multidimensional scaling (MDS, PROXSCAL) to analyse 
the value structure and the location of rational truth and non-rational truth 
values in that structure. Bivariate relationships were analysed using 
Pearson’s correlations. Studies I and II used logistic regression analyses to 
further examine the associations of values with RQEV and with non-
adherence, and Study III used Poisson regression analyses (see, e.g., Coxe, 
West, & Aiken, 2009) to examine the associations between values and 
preferences in seeking health advice.  
Since personal values are interrelated both theoretically and empirically, 
entering all of them simultaneously into a regression model is likely to create 
multicollinearity problems (Sagiv, Sverdlik, & Schwarz, 2011). This was the 
case also in all datasets used in the present study, as evidenced by large 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values, which exceeded the general threshold 
of 10 (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006, p. 230). To avoid 
multicollinearity problems in the regression analyses used in Study I, a 
separate analysis was conducted for each value. Studies II and III used value 
dimension variables that were not correlated too highly with each other to 
cause multicollinearity problems. 
Study III used cross-level operator (CLOP) analysis (James & Williams, 
2000) to cross levels from the group (country, in this case) to the individual, 
because the sample size of countries was too low to be able to use 
conventional multilevel modelling (MLM). In CLOP analysis, the group score 
is assigned to all individuals in that group, and thus the country score of 
personal freedom, i.e. opportunity (from Porter et al., 2015), was assigned to 
each individual from that country. The regression coefficients obtained using 
CLOP are very similar to those obtained using MLM (Klein et al., 2000). 
However, the CLOP approach differs from MLM in that it does not partition 
variance into within- and between-unit components, but uses both 
contextual-level and individual-level independent variables to explain total 
variance at the individual level. MLM, by contrast, uses contextual variables 
to explain between-unit variance (Klein et al., 2000). Because of this, the 
effect sizes of the contextual variable obtained using CLOP analysis are much 
smaller than those obtained using MLM. 
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In Studies II and III the data was weighted using the weights present in 
the ESS data (see Ganninger, n.d.). The design weight adjusts for the slightly 
different chances of selection in each country and it was used in the within-
country analyses. The population size weight adjusts for differences in the 
population size between countries. These two weights were used in 
combination (that is, they were multiplied together) in analyses using pooled 
data from more than one country. All statistical analyses were conducted 
using either Statistical package PASW Statistics or IBM SPSS Statistics. 
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6 RESULTS 
6.1 THE LOCATION OF TRUTH VALUES IN 
SCHWARTZ’S VALUE STRUCTURE 
Multidimensional scaling was used to study the value structure in Study I, 
with the main focus being on the location of rational and non-rational truth 
values. Figure 2 presents the two-dimensional solution of the 46 PVQ value 
items. The lines were drawn onto the figure to partition the space into 
separate value regions. On the basis of the obtained stress-1 value of 0.13, the 
two-dimensional solution is adequate for depicting the relationships among 
the 46 value items (Sturrock & Rocha, 2000). 
Regarding the location of the truth-related values in the value structure, 
Figure 2 shows that rational truth formed a distinct subregion within the 
region of self-direction, and that benevolence was adjacent to it. Non-rational 
truth did not form a distinct region. Instead, non-rational truth items were 
intermixed with tradition items in a wide region between other conservation 
values and self-enhancement values. Rational and non-rational truth 
emerged opposite to each other in the value structure.  
The obtained two-dimensional solution mainly corresponded with 
Schwartz's (1992) theoretical value structure. All values, except tradition, 
emerged as a distinct region. There were some slight deviations from the 
theoretical value structure. First, some values emerged behind another value 
rather than side by side. Schwartz’s theory predicts such a split only for 
tradition (peripheral) and conformity (central), however, this did not appear 
in the present data. Instead, power emerged behind achievement, hedonism 
emerged behind stimulation and universalism emerged partly behind 
benevolence. Each of these two values that form the pairs is adjacent to the 
other in the theoretical structure. In addition, security emerged behind both 
conformity and universalism. Security and conformity are adjacent in 
theoretical structure, however security and universalism are not.  
Second, as regards the order of values, the adjacent values of universalism 
and benevolence emerged in reversed order compared to the theoretical 
value structure, as did tradition and security. Similar reversals have been 
observed also in other studies (de Boer, Hoogland, & Boersema, 2007; 
Koivula & Verkasalo, 2006; Schwartz et al., 2001; 2012). Bilsky, Janik, and 
Schwartz (2011) argued that such splits and reversals of the order of two 
values are probably of minor importance when they concern adjacent values. 
The third type of deviation concerned single items, of which only three items 
were mislocated, emerging in a region of another value. Two of these (one 
hedonism item and one stimulation item) were not very far away from their 
hypothesised regions and, thus, these deviations are probably of minor 
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importance (Bilsky et al., 2011). One tradition item (importance of religion) 
was more clearly mislocated. 
The MDS analysis reported in Study I was conducted using the absolute, 
i.e., non-centred value items, as Schwartz (2007) recommended. An 
additional analysis was conducted using centred scores, and the obtained 
solution was identical to that reported in Study I (cf. Bilsky et al., 2015).  
 
 
 
Figure 2 Ordinal multidimensional scaling (MDS, PROXSCAL) of 46 PVQ items (n = 296). be 
= benevolence, un = universalism, sd = self-direction, st = stimulation, he = 
hedonism, ac = achievement, po = power, se = security, co = conformity, tr = 
tradition, ra = rational truth, nr = non-rational truth. A circle around an item indicates 
mislocation. (Source: Study I: Ahola, 2016) 
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6.2 VALUES AND THE READINESS TO QUESTION 
EXPERTS’ VIEWS 
The associations of values with the readiness to question experts’ views 
(RQEV) were analysed using Pearson’s correlations and logistic regression 
analyses (Study I). Regarding zero-order correlations (Table 1), power (p = 
.043) and rational truth (p = .003) were positively associated with RQEV, 
whereas tradition (p = .009) was negatively associated. Furthermore, the 
associations of security (p = .078) and conformity (p = .067) were negative, 
though only marginally significant. Being more educated was also associated 
with RQEV (p = .031), and the association of age (p = .074) was marginally 
positive. 
A separate logistic regression analysis was conducted for each value, and 
each of the analyses was adjusted for the effects of demographic variables 
(Table 2). Power and rational truth were statistically significantly and 
positively associated with RQEV, whereas security, conformity and tradition 
were significantly and negatively associated. Moreover, the association of 
stimulation was marginally positive. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients for Values and 
Demographic Variables with RQEV (Source: Study I: Ahola, 2016) 
 Age Sex Education RQEV M/% SD 
Benevolence .03  .20 ** .02  -.01  0.65 0.72 
Universalism .38 *** .09  .10  .08  0.84 0.70 
Self-direction .07  -.04  .14 * .10  0.60 0.68 
Stimulation -.23 *** -.05  -.04  .10  -0.52 0.99 
Hedonism -.32 *** .05  -.17 * -.08  0.01 1.03 
Achievement -.42 *** -.16 * .01  .04  -0.79 1.11 
Power -.32 *** -.11  .04  .14 * -1.16 1.05 
Security .30 *** .03  -.01  -.12  0.60 0.73 
Tradition .11  -.10  -.17 * -.18 ** -0.81 0.83 
Conformity .17 * .00  .05  -.13  0.06 0.83 
Rational truth  .19 ** .03  .18 ** .20 ** 0.63 0.75 
Non-rational truth .10  .13  -.15 * -.10  -1.25 0.87 
Age  ––  .05  .16 * .12  44.4 15.1 
Sexa    ––  .25 *** .08  62.9d  
Educationb      ––  .15 * 56.8e  
RQEVc        ––  72.8f  
 
Note. RQEV = the readiness to question experts’ views. n = 213 (valid cases after listwise deletion of 
missing values).  
a0 = man, 1 = woman. b0 = lower level: basic or upper secondary, 1 = higher level: tertiary education. 
c0 = emerging or no RQEV, 1 = clear RQEV. d% women. e% higher level education. f% clear RQEV. 
***p < .001. **p < .01. *p < .05. 
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Table 2.  Logistic Regression Analysesa for Values and RQEVb (Source: Study I: Ahola, 
2016) 
 b (SE) p OR [95 % CI] Nagelkerke R2c 
Benevolence -0.06 (0.23) .778 0.94 [0.60-1.46] .047 
Universalism 0.10 (0.24) .675 1.11 [0.69-1.78] .048 
Self-direction 0.29 (0.23) .212 1.34 [0.85-2.12] .057 
Stimulation 0.33 (0.17) .054 1.40 [0.99-1.96] .072 
Hedonism -0.09 (0.16) .595 0.92 [0.66-1.26] .048 
Achievement 0.26 (0.16) .115 1.29 [0.94-1.78] .063 
Power 0.48 (0.17) .006 1.61 [1.15-2.27] .098 
Security -0.58 (0.25) .019 0.56 [0.34-0.91] .086 
Conformity -0.47 (0.21) .024 0.62 [0.42-0.94] .082 
Tradition -0.50 (0.20) .013 0.61 [0.41-0.90] .088 
Rational truth 0.52 (0.22) .017 1.68 [1.10-2.58] .085 
Non-rational truth -0.30 (0.19) .117 0.74 [0.51-1.08] .063 
 
Note. RQEV = the readiness to question experts’ views; OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence interval.  
aSeparate analysis for each value, n = 213–214. Analyses are adjusted for age, sex, and education. 
bRQEV is the dependent variable. cA pseudo-measure of R2 including control variables and one value 
variable (Nagelkerke R2 for control variables only ranged from .046 to .047). 
6.3 REASONS FOR NOT DISAGREEING WITH EXPERTS  
Analysis of the respondents’ reasons for not disagreeing with experts or not 
expressing disagreement revealed four main categories. The first was related 
to individual factors, the second involved situational factors, the third 
concerned social risks and the fourth was related to views about experts. All 
but ten (out of 63) accounts had components falling into these categories. 
Largest of the categories, the individual factors category, involved 
different types of descriptions of the self: personal characteristics, 
unwillingness to disagree and trust in experts. Reasons related to personal 
characteristics ranged from descriptions of the respondent's personal traits 
and typical actions to not caring about others’ views (e.g., “I have not 
disagreed with an expert, because I am an agreeable and trusting person”). 
Some reasons were also related to not having particular characteristics or 
properties, such as the respondent's lack of knowledge or inability to justify 
their views. Other reasons concerned the respondent’s unwillingness to 
disagree, argue or dispute. Some respondents stated that they were unwilling 
or could not be bothered to dispute a matter, considered disagreement futile, 
or generally sought to avoid conflict (e.g., “I am uninterested in orally 
debating matters, because I don’t believe that expressing a difference in 
opinion like this leads to a better solution”). Moreover, some reasons were 
related to trust in experts or professionals, in their knowledge or skills, or the 
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belief that experts know better (e.g., “I have trusted experts’ professional 
skills and have not questioned them”).  
The situational factors category had two subcategories: importance of the 
issue and practical realities. Regarding importance of the issue, some 
respondents explained that they express dissenting views only if the issue is 
important enough, or that they do not express their views if the issue or the 
difference of opinion is small or unimportant (e.g., “I have had a different 
opinion, but in those situations I haven’t felt the matter was important 
enough to mention. They have not been very significant topics or matters.”). 
Regarding practical realities, some respondents stated that they seldom met 
experts (e.g., “I live in a very small rural village, so I have little to do with 
experts”).  
The first of the two small categories, the social risks category, involved 
such reasons as an unwillingness to hurt the expert’s feelings or stand out. 
This category is reflected in the first part of the second sentence in the 
following example: “I have often disagreed with experts, but have just not 
expressed my opinion on the matter. I always think I want to avoid hurting 
the opponent or don’t want my opinion to lead to a heated discussion. That is 
why I have seen it better to keep quiet.” The second small category, experts 
will not change their view, included arguments that experts stubbornly 
adhere to their own views or would reject a differing view (e.g., “They will not 
change their view, even though they are experts; their view is the only correct 
one”).  
6.4 TOPICS OF DISAGREEMENT 
The topics on which respondents questioned experts’ views or disagreed with 
them were varied and ranged from personal issues (concerning the 
respondent, another person, a group or a community) to more general facts 
or knowledge claims.  
Most of the reported disagreements were with doctors and other social or 
health care professionals (n = 53). These disagreements were mostly about 
personal health issues and concerned diagnosis (is there something wrong; 
what is wrong, n = 17), treatment of a condition (is a treatment needed; what 
kind of treatment is needed, n = 23), or inadequate examination (n = 4). 
Sometimes an account included more than one of these aspects, for example 
a disagreement could be both about the diagnosis and the need for a 
treatment. Further, some disagreements were about general medical 
questions (n = 5) and the rest (n = 4) did not fit into these categories. 
Disagreements with managers or other superiors in a workplace were also 
frequently reported (n = 38). They often concerned employment issues 
(salary, hiring, firing or vacations, n = 14) or changes at the workplace (n = 
6). Various other topics were also mentioned (e.g., practices, bad treatment, 
n = 18). Many respondents reported a disagreement incident with teachers, 
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principals, lecturers, researchers or professors (n = 33). These were often 
about knowledge claims or their justification (n = 8), the correct answer or 
solution to an assignment or a problem (n = 5) or grading (n = 4). Various 
other topics also received mentions (e.g., rules, requirements, teaching 
materials, n = 16). Disagreements with other experts (n = 21) were less 
frequently mentioned. 
6.5 VALUES AND NON-ADHERENCE TO DOCTORS’ 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Study II examined the associations of values with non-adherence to doctors’ 
instructions. Correlation analyses indicated that openness to change 
correlated positively with both non-adherent views (r = .13, p < .001) and 
non-adherent behaviour (r = .09, p < .001) in the pooled data from 14 
countries and that conservation correlated negatively with these two types of 
non-adherence (non-adherent views: r = −.14, p < .001; non-adherent 
behaviour: r = −.08, p < .001). Openness to change correlated positively and 
significantly with non-adherent views in 12 countries (coefficients ranged 
from .02 to .22 across countries) and with non-adherent behaviour in 12 
countries (coefficients from .03 to .13). Conservation correlated significantly 
negatively with non-adherent views in 12 countries (coefficients from -.23 to 
-.03) and with non-adherent behaviour in 12 countries (coefficients from -.13 
to -.03). Self-enhancement correlated positively with non-adherent views (r 
= .07, p < .001) and behaviour (r = .04, p < .001) in the pooled data, whereas 
the correlations of self-transcendence were near zero (non-adherent views: r 
= -.01, p = .205; non-adherent behaviour: r = -.02, p = .025). Self-
enhancement correlated positively and significantly with non-adherent views 
in six countries (coefficients from -.01 to .12) and with non-adherent 
behaviour in five (coefficients from -.01 to .09). The correlation of self-
transcendence with non-adherent views was significantly positive in one 
country and negative in one (coefficients from -.12 to .08) and significantly 
negative with non-adherent behaviour in two countries (coefficients from -.11 
to .04).  
Overall, the sizes of the associations were larger and more consistent for 
conservation and openness-to-change values than for self-enhancement and 
self-transcendence values. The correlation between non-adherent views and 
behaviour was positive and significant in the pooled data (r = .15, p < .001) 
and in all countries except Iceland, in which it was positive but non-
significant (coefficients from r = .08 to r = .23). 
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Logistic regression analyses were conducted to test the robustness of the 
associations between values and non-adherence and to test whether values 
have independent effects after adjusting for the effects of control variables. 
First, country dummy variables and control variables were entered into the 
model (Block 1, Table 3), and second, value orientation variables openness to 
change (vs. conservation), and self-enhancement (vs. self-transcendence) 
were added (Block 2, Table 3). Table 3 shows the odds ratios and their 
associated 95% confidence intervals for these variables (except country 
dummy variables) in the pooled data. Openness-to-change value orientation 
was positively and significantly associated with both non-adherent views and 
non-adherent behaviour, whereas the associations of self-enhancement 
orientation were not significant. Corresponding analyses were conducted in 
each country adjusting for the effects of control variables. Openness-to-
change orientation was positively and significantly associated with non-
adherent views in 11 countries and with non-adherent behaviour in seven. 
Self-enhancement orientation was significantly negatively associated with 
non-adherent views in one country (Switzerland). As regards non-adherent 
behaviour, self-enhancement was significantly positively associated in one 
country (Belgium) and significantly negatively in one (Norway). Therefore, in 
conclusion, openness-to-change (vs. conservation) value dimension was 
more consistently associated with non-adherence than was self-enhancement 
(vs. self-transcendence) value dimension. 
6.6 VALUES AND PREFERENCES IN SEEKING HEALTH 
ADVICE OR TREATMENT 
The relationships between values and preferences in seeking health advice or 
treatment were examined in Study III. First, Pearson’s correlation analyses 
were conducted in pooled datasets. Conservation correlated positively with 
preferring doctors’ advice (r = .15, p < .001) and negatively with preferring 
other practitioners’ advice (r = -.11, p < .001) in ESS round 2. Self-
transcendence correlated positively with preferring doctors’ advice (r = .08, p 
< .001) and with preferring other practitioners’ advice (r = .02, p = .001), 
though the latter correlation was near zero. Conservation correlated 
negatively (r = -.14, p < .001) and self-transcendence correlated positively 
with CAM use (r = .11, p < .001) in ESS round 7.  
As regards country-specific associations in ESS round 2 data from 14 
countries, conservation correlated positively and significantly with preferring 
doctors’ advice in 13 countries (coefficients ranged from .05 to .26 across 
countries) and negatively and significantly with preferring other 
practitioners’ advice in 8 (coefficients from -.14 to -.04). Self-transcendence 
correlated positively and significantly with preferring doctors’ advice in 11 
countries (coefficients from -.05 to .19) and with preferring other 
practitioners’ advice in 3 (coefficients from -.02 to .08). Regarding ESS 
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round 7 data from 12 countries, conservation correlated negatively and 
significantly with CAM use in all countries (coefficients from -.13 to -.05) and 
self-transcendence correlated positively and significantly in 8 (coefficients 
from -.002 to .12). Moreover, the associations of conservation with 
preferences in seeking health advice were consistent in 8 countries, meaning 
that in these countries it correlated significantly positively with preferring 
doctors’ advice and significantly negatively with preferring other 
practitioners’ advice and with CAM use. 
Table 4 shows the results of the Poisson regression analyses in the pooled 
datasets from ESS rounds 2 and 7. Both value dimensions were significantly 
positively associated with preferring doctors’ advice in Model 1a. After 
adjusting for the individual-level and country-level control variables in 
Models 1b and 1c, the association of self-transcendence became non-
significant, whereas that of conservation remained statistically significant. 
Age was the strongest predictor of all variables entered in Model 1c, with 
older people being more likely to prefer doctors’ advice. Moreover, 
respondents who assessed their health as being better and those living in 
countries that allow for higher levels of personal freedom (i.e., opportunity) 
were less likely to prefer doctors’ advice; the same applied to females and 
more-educated people. 
Regarding the outcome preferring other practitioners’ advice, 
conservation was negatively and self-transcendence positively associated 
with it in Model 2a, whereas only the association of conservation remained 
statistically significant after adjusting for the effects of control variables in 
Models 2b and 2c. Gender was the strongest predictor of preferring other 
practitioners’ advice with females being more likely than males to prefer 
other practitioners’ advice. Conservation was the second strongest predictor, 
and was negatively associated with preferring other practitioners’ advice, 
whereas country-level personal freedom (opportunity) and individual-level 
education were positively associated with such preference.  
As regards CAM use, conservation was significantly negatively and self-
transcendence significantly positively associated with it both initially (Model 
3a) and after adjusting for the effects of control variables (Models 3b and 3c). 
Gender was the strongest predictor in Model 3c, followed by subjective 
health, conservation, and education. Female gender and education were 
positively associated with CAM use, whereas the associations of subjective 
health and conservation were negative. Finally, country-level personal 
freedom (opportunity) and age were also positively and significantly 
associated with CAM use. 
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7 DISCUSSION 
Generally speaking, the aim of this thesis was to examine the role of personal 
values in laypeople’s stances towards expert knowledge. The role of values in 
this context has to date been rarely studied, even though some research 
(Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Boer & Fischer, 2013; Miles, 2015; Roccas & Sagiv, 
2010) have demonstrated that values play a role in a wide range of attitudes, 
behavioural intentions and behaviours. This thesis contributes to filling this 
gap in the literature by examining the associations of values with stances 
towards expert knowledge from three different perspectives: 1) readiness to 
question experts’ views, 2) non-adherence to doctors’ instructions, and 3) 
preference for consulting medical experts or for consulting other 
practitioners for health advice or treatment. 
Schwartz’s (1992) value theory was used as the overall theoretical 
framework, although two values not originally part of Schwartz’s model were 
also considered, namely rational truth and non-rational truth (Wach & 
Hammer, 2003a, 2003b). This dissertation views the concept of expert 
widely: not restricted to scientific experts but including other authorities, 
such as teachers and superiors in a workplace. Using survey data from 
Finland and from a range of other European countries, this study found that, 
first, values play a role in laypeople’s readiness to question experts’ views; 
second, that values are related to patient non-adherence; and third, that 
values are associated with laypeople’s preferences in seeking health advice or 
treatment from medical experts or from practitioners of complementary and 
alternative medicine.  
This study expected and found that the value dimension of openness to 
change (readiness for new ideas, actions, and experiences) versus 
conservation (self-restriction, order, and avoiding change) (see Schwartz, 
1992; Schwartz et al., 2012) would be particularly relevant to laypeople’s 
stances towards expert knowledge. More specifically, the results indicated 
that people endorsing conservation (vs. openness-to-change) values were less 
prepared to question experts’ views, more likely to adhere to doctors’ 
instructions, and more likely to prefer consulting conventional health care 
experts (i.e. medical doctors) for health advice or treatment. They were also 
less likely to prefer consulting other practitioners, and less likely to have used 
CAM (complementary and alternative medicine) treatments. Although it was 
assumed that the value dimension contrasting self-transcendence and self-
enhancement would be less important in the context of the present study, it 
was nevertheless included in all three studies in order to cover all values of 
Schwartz’s (1992) theory. Indeed, it was found that self-transcendence (vs. 
self-enhancement) was associated with CAM use. It was also found, 
unexpectedly, that power—which is a self-enhancement value—was related to 
readiness to question experts’ views (RQEV). The inclusion of the two truth-
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related values (Wach & Hammer, 2003a, 2003b) in addition to the ten values 
of Schwartz’s (1992) theory also yielded interesting new insights. To the best 
of the author's knowledge, this is the first time that rational truth and non-
rational truth values have been studied in Finland using a population-based 
sample. Therefore, this study added to the literature by analysing the location 
of these truth-related values in the value structure as well as their 
relationships with RQEV. It was found that people endorsing rational truth 
were more prepared to question experts’ views, which is a novel finding. 
Moreover, this study contributed to the literature regarding reasons for 
avoiding upward dissent by analysing laypeople’s reasons for not disagreeing 
with experts. These reasons were found to concern individual factors, 
situational factors, social risks and views about experts. The findings of the 
three studies comprising this dissertation are discussed in more detail below, 
followed by a discussion of methodological considerations and future 
directions.  
7.1 VALUES OF RATIONAL AND NON-RATIONAL 
TRUTH 
Study I examined the location of Wach and Hammer’s (2003b) two truth-
related values in Schwartz’s (1992) value structure and found that rational 
truth emerged as a distinct subregion within the region of self-direction, 
whereas the items measuring non-rational truth did not form a distinct 
region but were intermixed with the items measuring tradition. The 
hypothesis that rational truth would be located closest to self-direction was 
supported. This finding is also consistent with Wach and Hammer’s (2003b) 
proposition that rational truth would be a subtype of self-direction. It was 
also expected that self-transcendence values would be adjacent to rational 
truth. Indeed, rational truth emerged between self-direction and 
benevolence, the latter of which is a self-transcendence value. However, it 
should be noted that benevolence and universalism emerged in reversed 
order as compared to their locations in Schwartz’s theoretical model. The 
hypothesis that non-rational truth would be located closest to security with 
power adjacent to it was only partially supported. Non-rational truth was 
intermixed with tradition, which in turn was located between the other 
conservation values (security and conformity) and the self-enhancement 
values (power and achievement). These two truth-related values seem worth 
exploring also in future studies, particularly when the focus of interest is on 
knowledge-related topics. Future studies could also examine the role of 
rational and non-rational truth values in the context of health, for instance 
whether they are related to individuals’ preference of conventional medicine 
versus CAM. 
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7.2 VALUES AND STANCES TOWARDS EXPERT 
KNOWLEDGE 
Study I addressed the relationships between individuals’ values and RQEV 
among randomly sampled Finns. As expected, endorsing rational truth 
values was positively associated and valuing security, conformity and 
tradition were negatively associated with RQEV. The associations of 
stimulation and self-direction with RQEV were positive as expected, though 
statistically non-significant. These findings are in line with those of previous 
studies—especially if rational truth is considered as a subtype of self-
direction as Wach and Hammer (2003b) proposed, and therefore as a part of 
openness-to-change values—namely that valuing conservation was positively 
and openness to change was negatively associated with authoritarian 
submission (i.e. passive obedience to authority; Passini, 2015) and trust in 
institutions (Morselli et al., 2012). These findings are also consistent with the 
positive association between the personality trait of openness to experience 
and upward dissent (Ötken & Cenkci, 2015). It is particularly interesting to 
note that rational truth values were more relevant in the context of RQEV 
than the other openness-to-change values. This is understandable because 
the focus of rational truth values is on finding the truth and individuals 
endorsing this value can pursue it by questioning experts in knowledge-
related issues. Moreover, power was found to be positively associated with 
RQEV, although this was not hypothesised. This association is nevertheless 
theoretically meaningful, because questioning experts’ views may be a way of 
gaining control or dominance over experts. Consistent with this, Nussbaum 
and Bendixen (2003) found that assertiveness—tendency to dominate—was 
positively related to approaching arguments and negatively related to 
avoiding arguments. However, in other studies, power was positively, albeit 
weakly, correlated with trust in institutions (Devos et al., 2002) and 
authoritarian submission (Passini, 2015). Therefore, it would be worthwhile 
for future studies to further examine the role of power values in the context 
of RQEV and more generally in laypeople’s relationships with experts and 
authorities. It would be interesting to analyse the role of power values in 
different contexts, including interpersonal arguments or disagreements with 
experts as well as general stances towards experts and authorities. 
Nevertheless, the results of Study I indicate that two different types of 
motivations underlie readiness to question experts’ views: pursuit of 
knowledge and pursuit of power.  
Studies II and III, using data from a range of European countries, 
examined the role of values in two different contexts of health care—
adherence to medical experts’ instructions (Study II), and seeking health 
advice or treatment from conventional medical experts or other health 
practitioners (Study III). Study II found that the openness-to-change (vs. 
conservation) value dimension was associated with non-adherent views and 
non-adherent behaviour. In line with what was hypothesised, people 
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endorsing openness to change over conservation were less likely to think that 
it is best to follow doctors’ orders and were less likely to have followed 
doctors’ medical prescriptions. The associations of openness-to-change (vs. 
conservation) value dimension remained statistically significant even after 
adjusting for the effects of countries, demographic variables, and views about 
the doctor–patient relationship.  
Study III found that the conservation (vs. openness-to-change) value 
dimension played a role in preferences in seeking health advice. More 
specifically, as expected, endorsing conservation was positively associated 
with preferring medical doctors’ advice or treatment in cases of different 
symptoms, and negatively associated with preferring other practitioners and 
the use of CAM treatments. Similar kinds of results have been obtained in 
previous studies, namely that the openness-to-experience personality trait 
was associated with the breadth and frequency of CAM use and with having 
used CAM (Hildreth & Elman, 2007; Honda & Jacobson, 2005; Sirois & 
Purc-Stephenson, 2008; Thomson et al., 2014a), and that new and 
infrequent users of CAM scored higher on openness to experience than users 
of conventional medicine (Sirois & Gick, 2002). However, openness to 
experience and preferences in seeking health advice were not always found to 
be associated (Furnham, 2007; Hildreth & Elman, 2007; Thomson et al., 
2014b). Furthermore, as hypothesised, Study III found that valuing self-
transcendence (vs. self-enhancement) was positively associated with CAM 
use, but contrary to expectations, it was not statistically significantly 
associated with the preference to consult other practitioners. This is 
consistent with Saher and Lindeman’s (2005) finding that self-transcendence 
(vs. self-enhancement) value dimension was only weakly associated with 
believing in the efficacy of CAM. 
Study III further considered whether country-level personal freedom 
plays a role in people’s preferences in seeking health advice. As expected, 
living in countries characterised by a higher level of personal freedom was 
negatively associated with preferring to consult conventional doctors, and 
positively associated with preferring other practitioners and CAM use.  
Taken together, these results indicate that people valuing openness to 
change tend to be more critical towards experts’ views and less likely to 
follow medical experts’ instructions. The opposite was the case for those 
valuing conservation; they were also found to be more likely to rely on 
conventional medical experts and less likely to consult complementary or 
alternative health practitioners. Therefore, openness-to-change (vs. 
conservation) values seem to motivate people to not take conventional forms 
of expertise for granted, but instead to challenge conventional experts and 
also rely on alternative sources for advice. 
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7.3 REASONS FOR NOT DISAGREEING WITH EXPERTS 
An examination of laypeople’s reasons for not disagreeing with experts 
(Study I) indicated that some of these reasons were related to their own 
personal characteristics, traits or typical actions. Consistent with this, 
previous studies and theoretical models on upward dissent have identified 
employees’ individual characteristics as one of the considerations in their 
decisions of whether or not to express upward dissent (e.g., Kassing, 1997, 
2008; Milliken et al., 2003).  
Some respondents also reported trust in experts or professionals as a 
reason for not disagreeing with experts, a finding identified previously only 
in a sample of university students in Finland, who were asked about their 
reasons for not having disagreed with teachers or other experts in 
knowledge-related matters (Keso, 2002; Pirttilä-Backman & Keso; 1998). 
Relatedly, in a correlational study, Hall et al. (2002) found that trust in 
physicians was associated with not having had a past disagreement or 
dispute with the physician. On the other hand, Payne (2014) found that trust 
in supervisor correlated positively with upward dissent. Moreover, an 
experimental study that manipulated the level of trust in a supervisor found 
that “participants in the high and low trust-in-supervisor conditions were 
more likely to engage in explicitly moralised dissent than participants in the 
baseline-control condition—those who reported comparatively moderate 
trust-in-supervisor” (Zanin, Bisel, & Adame, 2016, p. 159) in response to a 
hypothetical unethical request by the supervisor. On the basis of these 
contradictory findings, it seems likely that trust operates differently in 
different situations or contexts and also depends on the focus and target of 
trust. It appears that higher levels of trust in experts’ knowledge and skills 
may not evoke the need or willingness to question experts in knowledge-
related matters. This may particularly apply to the relationship between 
laypeople and epistemic experts. In contrast, employees may be more willing 
to express their differing views in the workplace when they trust the 
supervisor, in the sense that their dissent will be received in a constructive 
manner and that it will not result in retribution (Zanin et al., 2016). This may 
be typical to a relationship that is based more on authority than expertise. 
Therefore, it would be fruitful to examine how different aspects of trust relate 
to RQEV. Future studies could also examine whether trust-related reasons 
are specific to cases in which epistemic experts’ views have not yet been 
questioned, or whether trust in experts also play a role in deliberations of 
whether or not to express a differing view to an expert. In this study, trust in 
experts was considered as an individual factor, but it is also possible to see it 
as a relational factor concerning the relationship between laypeople and 
experts.  
Unwillingness to disagree, considering it futile, or seeking to avoid 
conflict also featured among respondents’ reasons for not disagreeing with 
experts. These themes, particularly the anticipated efficacy or futility of 
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speaking up, have been identified as a recurring theme in literature on 
employee voice and silence (Morrison, 2014). Although largely overlooked in 
their responses, some respondents mentioned social risks and others 
mentioned thinking that experts would not change their view. Unwillingness 
to take social risks and to invest effort into something that is considered 
futile could be viewed as cost-benefit considerations (cf. Paglieri & 
Castelfranchi, 2010). Anticipation of social risks and other punishment (such 
as retaliation) is featured both in Kassing’s (1997) and Milliken et al.’s (2003) 
models. Social risks could be also viewed as relational considerations, 
concerning either how an expression of a disagreement affects the other 
party or what kinds of consequences it has for the self or for the relationship 
in the future (cf. Milliken et al., 2003). Therefore, such considerations may 
be less important for a layperson in cases in which it is likely that she or he 
will not meet the expert or the authority again as compared to cases in which 
the relationship is more long-lasting, such as the employee-supervisor-
relationship or the student-teacher-relationship (for the latter, see Bolkan & 
Goodboy, 2016). Future studies could test this possibility.  
Some reasons for not disagreeing with experts point to the importance of 
different aspects of situational factors, namely importance of the issue and 
practical realities. The latter reason is straightforward: some respondents 
reported seldom meeting experts, and thus had little reason or possibility to 
disagree with them. Considerations of the importance of the issue for an 
individual implies that experts are not readily challenged unless the issue is 
very important or the difference of opinion is substantial enough. Relatedly, 
Infante and Rancer (1982) considered an individual’s perceived importance 
of success in a particular argument as a situational factor. Although 
importance of the issue was considered as a situational factor also in the 
present study, it is likely that personal values for their part also influence an 
individual’s considerations of the importance of the issue and which issues 
are important enough to warrant questioning expert’s views.  
By analysing laypeople’s reasons for not disagreeing or not expressing 
disagreement with experts this study contributed to the relatively sparse 
literature on individuals’ reasons for avoiding upward dissent, particularly in 
knowledge-related matters. 
7.4 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Strengths. Examining the associations of personal values with stances 
towards expert knowledge from three different perspectives and using data 
from population-based samples from a range of European countries are the 
main strengths of this study. In Studies II and III, the countries were chosen 
from the ESS (European Social Survey) datasets on the basis of the evidence 
(e.g., Davidov, 2008) concerning cross-cultural measurement equivalence of 
personal values in these countries. Although this choice allowed for using 
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data only from a limited number of countries, it enhances the likelihood that 
the value items are understood similarly in all countries and thus increases 
the reliability of the findings. It also provided a valuable opportunity to study 
the associations of values with non-adherence and preferences in seeking 
health advice across a range of countries.  
Samples. Compared to previous studies on upward dissent, which were 
conducted among employees or university students, a strength of Study I is 
that it used a population-based sample, including people of varied ages and 
different educational backgrounds. However, the response rate of 32% was 
relatively low. Regarding the ESS samples used in Studies II and III, 
response rates ranged from 43.6% to 79.1% in round 2 and from 31.4% to 
65.8% in round 7 (European Social Survey, n.d.-a, n.d.-b). Low response 
rates in some countries may somewhat limit the generalisability of the results 
to the wider population in those countries. 
The focus in all three studies was on laypeople’s stances towards expert 
knowledge, and Studies II and III considered in particular medical expertise. 
Study II focused on laypeople’s non-adherence to medical experts’ 
instructions and Study III concentrated on laypeople’s preferences in seeking 
health advice from medical experts or other health care practitioners. 
However, it is important to note that not all ESS respondents are laypeople, 
in fact, the ESS datasets included respondents who are doctors or other 
health care professionals by occupation. Additional analyses indicated that 
excluding health professionals and health associate professionals from the 
analyses will not change the main results or the conclusions of Studies II and 
III. 
Measures. Some of the limitations concern the measures that were used 
in this study. Both personal values and stances towards expert knowledge 
were assessed using self-reported measures. As regards the self-reported 
measures of non-adherence (Study II), one possible source of bias is 
unwillingness to report non-adherence (Larsen et al., 2009; Vermeire et al., 
2001), which can be related to social desirability (Wagner & Miller, 2004). 
The limitations of human memory may also bias the behavioural measure of 
non-adherence (Wagner & Miller, 2004). Likewise, not remembering one’s 
past behaviour correctly or accurately may also bias the respondents’ 
accounts of disagreement incidents (or lack of them) with experts (Study I) 
and their responses regarding the use of different CAM treatments during the 
previous year (Study III). Using the ESS data in Studies II and III was 
advantageous, because it provided the opportunity to use high-quality data 
from a range of European countries. However, the drawback is that the 
variables were not designed for the purposes of the present study, which 
necessitated some methodological compromises (for considerations on 
analysing existing datasets, see Yorke, 2011), for example, in Study II, each 
type of non-adherence was measured using only a single item.  
Personal values were measured using two different versions of Schwartz’s 
Portrait Values Questionnaire. Study I used the 40-item PVQ and added six 
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items measuring values of truth, whereas Studies II and III used the 21-item 
PVQ that is included in the ESS. Each item in both versions is double-
barrelled, i.e. consisting of two sentences. Use of such items could be 
objected on the basis of the quality of the data possibly being compromised, 
because respondents might find the two sentences incompatible. However, 
Schwartz’s (2001) empirical analyses have demonstrated that this does not 
affect the quality of the data. Then again, in a more recent version of the 
PVQ, designed to measure the refined value theory, Schwartz and his 
colleagues (Schwartz et al., 2012) used a single-sentence format. Regarding 
Wach and Hammer’s (2003b) items measuring truth-related values used in 
Study I, Schwartz (2006b) suggested that these items are formulated more 
like beliefs than values. However, five of the six items refer explicitly to what 
is important to the person, a notion that is central to the concept of values. 
Nevertheless, more studies involving these truth-related values would be 
welcome to further examine their measurement properties.  
The reliabilities of some of the 12 value indices used in Study I were 
relatively low, which may be due to them being measured with only three to 
six items and that the items cover broad constructs (Caprara, Schwartz, 
Capanna, Vecchione, & Barbaranelli, 2006). In the 21-item PVQ used in the 
ESS, each value is measured with only two items (except universalism which 
is measured with three items), and thus the reliabilities of the ten values tend 
to be even lower (see, e.g., Verkasalo et al., 2009). Further, the 21-item PVQ 
yields very high correlations between some of the adjacent values and thus 
unifying them is advisable (Davidov, 2008). In view of the preceding, higher-
order values and value-dimension variables were used in Study II. The latter 
were computed by subtracting the scores of one pole of the value dimension 
from those of the other pole of that same dimension (e.g., the score of 
conservation was subtracted from the score of openness to change). In study 
III, two value dimension variables were computed using Verkasalo et al.’s 
(2009) equations. Using these two dimensions allowed for a parsimonious 
way to describe the relationships of values with non-adherence in Study II 
and with preferences in seeking health advice in Study III. However, a 
disadvantage is that the use of value dimensions did not allow for a more 
nuanced examination of the effects of different values. Verkasalo et al. 
(2009) noted that it is possible to criticise use of the two value dimensions on 
the grounds that the dimensions cannot handle nor adequately describe the 
values of an individual who has high scores on opposing values. For instance, 
an individual valuing both tradition and self-direction would receive an 
average score on the conservation dimension (Verkasalo et al., 2009). 
However, recent results by Borg et al. (2015) indicate that this should not be 
a major concern, since they found that almost all respondents’ values were 
organised according to the same circular value structure, which suggests that 
almost everybody experiences the conflicts and compatibilities among values 
very similarly.  
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The measure of RQEV was constructed from self-reported written 
accounts (Study I). This dichotomous measure differentiated between a clear 
RQEV and emerging or no RQEV. Unfortunately, the written accounts did 
not allow for distinguishing disagreeing tacitly from explicitly voicing a 
differing view. Such more nuanced distinctions could have provided 
interesting insights and possibly also stronger and clearer associations with 
values. For example, different values may motivate never disagreeing, 
disagreeing quietly, and explicitly questioning experts’ views. Relatedly, a 
recent study (Ötken & Cenkci, 2015) found that different personality traits 
were associated with different forms of organisational dissent, namely 
upward dissent (expressing dissent to managers), displaced dissent 
(expressing dissent to external audiences), and latent dissent (expressing 
dissent to co-workers). Thus, examining the role of values in different 
contexts of disagreement would seem a fruitful avenue for future research. 
The size of the associations. The sizes of the associations between values 
and stances towards expert knowledge were generally small. However, the 
observed associations were theoretically meaningful and the majority of 
them were also in line with the hypotheses. One possible explanation for the 
small effects lies in the abstract nature of values: people may not always be 
able to detect values and to connect them to particular situations (Maio, 
2010). Bardi and Schwartz (2003) suggested another explanation, namely 
that many other factors, such as norms, compete with values. They tested the 
idea that values would be more strongly associated with behaviour when the 
situational normative pressures are weaker and found support for it. 
However, the results of another study by Schwartz and Butenko (2014) failed 
to support this idea.  
Regarding Studies II and III, which examined non-adherence to doctors’ 
instructions and preferences in seeking health advice, inclusion of health-
specific value items, such as those recently proposed by Aavik and Dobewall 
(2016) may have produced stronger associations. As Aavik and Dobewall 
pointed out, Schwartz’s 21-item PVQ-instrument used in the ESS does not 
include any health items, and Schwartz’s other inventories include one health 
item each. However, it is also important to note that Schwartz conceptualised 
values as goals that transcend specific situations and that inclusion of 
context-specific values somewhat contradicts this idea (Aavik & Dobewall, 
2016). In any case, it would probably be unrealistic to expect that the 
associations of values would be very strong considering their abstract nature 
and the number of other factors that have been shown to be associated with 
stances towards expert advice in different contexts (e.g., non-adherence, 
seeking health advice, upward dissent). Nonetheless, it would be fruitful for 
researchers to include additional values that appear relevant in the particular 
context of their study, be they context-specific or likely to transcend specific 
situations. For example, it was useful to include truth-related values in Study 
I, which examined RQEV in knowledge-related matters.  
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Study design. Two of the studies were cross-national and as mentioned 
above, the countries that were included in Studies II and III were selected on 
the basis of the evidence concerning the invariance properties of the Portrait 
Values Questionnaire. This led to being able to include only a limited number 
of countries. In Study II, the effects of countries were taken into account by 
including country dummies as control variables in the logistic regression 
analyses, whereas in Study III a particular country-level effect was 
considered, namely, personal freedom. Unfortunately, due to the limited 
number of countries, it was not possible to use conventional multilevel 
modelling (such as hierarchical linear modelling). Instead, cross-level 
operator (CLOP) analysis (James & Williams, 2000) was used to cross levels 
from the country to the individual. This somewhat limits the findings of 
Study III related to personal freedom, because in CLOP the standard errors 
of contextual variables tend to be too small, thus potentially overestimating 
the statistical significance of the associations and making Type I errors more 
likely (Klein et al., 2000). Therefore, future studies should further examine 
the associations of personal freedom with preferences in seeking health 
advice using data from a larger number of countries, which would allow 
using conventional multilevel modelling. 
All the three datasets used in the present study were cross-sectional, and 
therefore it was not possible to draw causal conclusions regarding the 
relationships between values and stances towards expert knowledge. On one 
hand, it could be argued that since values develop early and remain relatively 
stable (Döring et al., 2016) and are central to personhood (Hitlin & Piliavin, 
2004), the influence of values on stances towards expert knowledge may be 
stronger. However, on the other hand, the reverse could be true since 
different authority figures (e.g., parents and teachers) are present in people’s 
lives from childhood. Moreover, Lutz and Keil (2002) found that children 
already at young age are able to think about expertise and also have an 
emerging, although limited, understanding of the division of cognitive 
labour—that different adults have different kinds of expertise. It is also 
possible that the relationships between values and stances towards expert 
knowledge are reciprocal. Future studies should use other than cross-
sectional designs in order to further clarify these relationships. 
7.5 FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND CONCLUDING 
REMARKS 
This dissertation set out to study laypeople’s stances towards expert 
knowledge from three different perspectives. However, the respondents were 
not explicitly asked about their stances towards expert knowledge or about 
their epistemic trust in experts. Instead, it was assumed that RQEV, non-
adherence to doctors’ instructions and preferring medical vs CAM providers 
for health advice or treatment reflect such stances. It was further assumed 
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that the latter two reflect laypeople’s epistemic trust in medical experts. 
However, it remains unclear whether the respondents actually considered the 
epistemic aspect of adherence to medical expert’s advice; for instance, 
whether or not they should place epistemic trust in the doctor prescribing the 
medicine. Also unanswered is whether their preferences and choices in 
seeking health advice or treatment included considerations of which health 
care provider might possess the most valid knowledge. However, it seems 
likely that epistemic considerations play a role in healthcare utilisation, given 
the recent research finding by Thomson et al. (2014a, p. 304), namely that 
"the respondents who agreed (or neither agreed or disagreed) the most 
important knowledge comes from spiritual experience were over twice as 
likely to use CAM, compared to those who disagreed". In any case, future 
studies could further examine the role of such epistemic considerations in 
people’s choices of which health care practitioners to consult and whether to 
follow their advice and instructions. 
Even though the results of the present study indicate that people 
endorsing openness-to-change values tend to be more prepared to question 
experts' views and less likely to adhere to medical experts’ advice, the actual 
contents of the experts’ views or recommendations and their compatibility 
with a layperson’s values are also likely to play a role. For example, a person 
for whom conservation values are very important may generally tend to 
follow expert’s advice, but may be less likely to do so if following that advice 
challenged the status quo. Correspondingly, such an individual may not 
generally question experts’ views, but may be more likely to do so if the issue 
is very important for her or him or if persuading the expert about one’s view 
helps one to gain stability and safety. There is also some evidence that the 
compatibility of important life goals with self-care recommendations is 
associated with better adherence to these recommendations at least in some 
self-care regimens (Zhang et al., 2015). On the other hand, following doctor’s 
instructions may prevent an individual from pursuing a value that is 
important for her or him. For instance, dietary restrictions may conflict with 
pleasure-seeking (see Karimi & Clark, 2016), which is an important 
motivational goal for people endorsing hedonism values. Therefore, it is also 
important to differentiate between different types of instructions and the 
extent to which following those instructions affect a patient’s life and her or 
his abilities to pursue important values. Unfortunately, it was not possible to 
test such content-related effects in the present study, because many of the 
reported disagreement incidents did not provide enough information about 
the content of the opposing views (Study I), and because there was no 
information on the content of doctors’ medical prescriptions or on the 
perceived effects of those prescriptions on respondents’ everyday life (Study 
II).  
Future studies on laypeople’s readiness to question experts’ views could 
focus on disagreements with specific experts and take a closer look at the 
nature of these disagreements. For example, the analysis of the topics of 
Discussion 
64 
disagreements in Study I indicated that some of the laypeople’s 
disagreements with experts occurred in medical encounters and were mainly 
related to differing views about the diagnosis and treatment. A recently 
introduced taxonomy of medical decisions (Ofstad, Frich, Schei, Frankel, & 
Gulbrandsen, 2016) could be used to make more fine-tuned distinctions of 
the content of disagreement between patients and doctors. Patients could be 
asked, for instance, whether and how often they have disagreed with 
different types of decisions made by a medical doctor and whether they 
explicitly questioned those decisions. More extensive patient narratives or 
recordings of medical consultations could also provide useful data. Indeed, 
the conversation analysis approach utilises recordings of medical 
consultations to study medical interactions between a patient and a doctor 
(e.g., Peräkylä, 2002). For instance, Peräkylä (2002) observed that patients 
were more likely to produce an extended response (instead of providing only 
minimal acknowledgement of the diagnosis) to the doctor’s diagnosis when 
the doctor explicated the evidence for the diagnosis compared with cases in 
which there was no such explication. Patients’ extended responses included 
“straight agreements, symptom descriptions, alternative diagnosis proposals, 
and actions related to the interpretation of evidence” (Peräkylä, 2002, p. 
243). 
It would also be interesting to examine whether the way in which 
disagreements were resolved (if resolved at all) affected the subsequent level 
of patient adherence to the doctor’s instructions. Similarly, Ijäs-Kallio, 
Ruusuvuori and Peräkylä (2010, p. 519) proposed that “research on the ways 
of achieving agreement on the diagnosis and the description of the patients’ 
range of accepting vs rejecting responses, together with investigating these 
with regard to the patients’ subsequent use of medicines, would contribute to 
our knowledge on ‘best practices’ in terms of health outcomes”. Future 
studies could also address the issue of the content of the disagreement 
between laypeople and experts by using scenario-based instruments, which 
would allow for standardising the content of disagreements. Scenario-based 
instruments have been used to assess such related issues as upward ethical 
dissent (Zanin et al., 2016), epistemic understanding (Barzilai & Weinstock, 
2015), and laypeople’s explanations for why scientists come up with differing 
scientific claims (Thomm et al., 2015).  
Patients’ understanding of the nature of medical knowledge and knowing 
is another important topic for future research. Kienhues and Bromme (2012) 
suggested that such epistemic beliefs about medicine are likely to be among 
the factors that influence patients’ health-related decisions, for instance, 
whether to follow a doctor’s advice. However, research considering epistemic 
beliefs about medicine is scarce and only a few such studies have been 
conducted among laypeople (Kienhues & Bromme, 2012; Kienhues, Stadtler, 
& Bromme, 2011), whereas in other studies the participants have been 
medical or health experts or professionals or novices (students) (e.g., 
Bientzle, Cress, & Kimmerle, 2014; Roex, Clarebout, Dory, & Degryse, 2009; 
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Roex, Degryse, & Clarebout, 2011). Future studies could examine whether 
epistemic beliefs about medicine are actually related to patient adherence 
and whether such beliefs also guide the selection of sources of health advice. 
Epistemic thinking may also play a role in people’s preparedness to question 
experts’ views, since particular epistemic beliefs (belief in certain and simple 
knowledge) have been associated with avoiding arguments (Nussbaum & 
Bendixen, 2003).  
The correlates of the avoidance component of argumentativeness are not 
yet well understood (Nussbaum & Bendixen, 2003). These two components 
of argumentativeness, approach and avoidance (Infante & Rancer, 1982), 
were found to be partly associated with different explanatory factors 
(Nussbaum & Bendixen, 2003). Similarly, regarding values, the avoidance 
component has been largely overlooked both in theoretical models of values 
and empirical research (for exceptions, see Aavik & Allik, 2006; Portman, 
2014; Van Quaquebeke, Graf, Kerschreiter, Schuh, & van Dick, 2014). 
Because values are defined as desirable, mainly positive values have been 
included in previous studies, whereas negative values—i.e. what people seek 
to avoid—have not been given much attention (Aavik & Allik, 2006). Studies 
that have considered negative (or counter-ideal) values concluded that 
negative values are not merely the opposite of positive (or ideal) values 
although they are related to some extent (Aavik & Allik, 2006; Schuh et al., 
2016). Incorporating both positive and negative values in future studies on 
upward dissent would be another fruitful area of research and could throw 
light on the reasons for avoiding arguments or unwillingness to express 
upward dissent. Morrison (2014, p. 185) proposed that “employees will 
engage in voice only when the motivators or driving forces are stronger than 
the inhibitors or restraining forces”. Therefore, it could also be useful to 
analyse the relative strengths of the effects of positive and negative values on 
individuals’ decisions to speak up or remain silent and whether different 
values motivate each of these.  
In the current study, country-level personal freedom was found to be 
related to preferences in seeking health advice (Study III). Studies could 
further examine whether personal freedom, or other contextual effects, also 
play a role in laypeople’s preparedness to question experts’ views. It can be 
assumed that people living in countries having a higher level of personal 
freedom would be more prepared to critically evaluate and to question 
experts’ views if necessary. Power distance (Hofstede, 2001) is another 
potentially relevant contextual factor in the case of RQEV, since it has been 
found to be positively associated with employee opinion-withholding 
(Huang, Van de Vliert, & Van der Vegt, 2005) and negatively associated with 
employee voice (Botero & Van Dyne, 2009), although in the latter study 
power distance was not treated as a country-level but as an individual-level 
variable reflecting the extent to which an individual is comfortable with 
status differences.  
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In modern societies, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for individuals to 
avoid encountering experts’ knowledge claims. Therefore, it is important to 
understand the factors that shape individuals’ stances towards expert 
knowledge. Previous studies have identified various factors that play a role in 
this context. However, the role of values in this context has been largely 
overlooked. This study demonstrates that personal values play a role in 
individuals’ stances towards expert knowledge and therefore contributes to 
filling this gap. 
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